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185 
GOVERNING FINANCIAL MARKETS: REGULATING 
CONFLICTS 
 
Kristin N. Johnson* 
Abstract: Payment, clearing, and settlement systems constitute a central component in the 
infrastructure of financial markets. These businesses provide channels for executing the 
largest and smallest commercial transactions in local, national, and international financial 
markets. Notwithstanding this significant role, there is a dearth of legal scholarship exploring 
central clearing counterparties (CCPs) and their contributions to the regulation of financial 
markets. To address this gap in the literature, this Article sketches the contours of the theory 
that frames regulation within financial institutions and across financial markets, examines the 
merits of implementing CCPs, and explores the role of CCPs as primary regulators within 
financial markets. Applying these theoretical constructs to a practical issue, this Article 
analyzes Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and 
the statute's introduction of mandatory clearing requirements in the over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives market. 
This Article advances several arguments that explore the merits of Title VII’s clearing 
mandate. First, this Article posits that introducing clearing requirements and authorizing only 
a handful of CCPs to execute clearing obligations concentrates systemic risk concerns. Title 
VII’s clearing mandate endows CCPs with the authority to serve as gatekeepers. As a result, 
these institutions become critical, first-line-of-defense regulators, managing risk within the 
OTC derivatives markets. Second, weak internal governance policies at CCPs raise 
noteworthy systemic risk concerns. CCP boards of directors face persistent and pernicious 
conflicts of interest that impede objective risk oversight, and thus may fail to adopt effective 
risk management oversight policies. Well-tailored corporate governance reforms are 
necessary to address these conflicts and to prevent CCP owners’ self-interested commercial 
incentives or other institutional constraints from triggering systemic risk concerns. 
                                                     
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School. B.S., Edmund J. Walsh School of 
Foreign Service, Georgetown University, with distinction; J.D., University of Michigan Law 
School. For their careful review of earlier drafts or thoughtful commentary that advanced the 
completion of this Article, I thank Sean Griffith, Chris Brummer, Bob Thompson, Renee Jones, 
Saule Omarova, Anna Gelpern, Heidi Schooner, Brett McDonnell, Lisa Fairfax, Joan Heminway, 
Jayne Barnard, Frank Partnoy, Christie Ford, andre cummings, Steven Davidoff, Zanita Fenton, 
Yesha Yadav, Timothy Glynn, Afra Afsharipour, Michael Simkovic, Andrew Lund, Nicola Sharpe, 
Cheryl Andrews, Monique Aiken and Carlos Lopez. For significant research assistance, I thank 
Jennifer Chawla, Kelly Anderson, and Marissa Licata. This Article benefited from the generous 
comments of participants at workshops hosted at Georgetown University Law Center, the 
University of Illinois Law School, Ohio State University-Moritz College of Law, the University of 
Utah-S.J. Quinney College of Law, the Lutie Lytle Writing Workshop, the American Association of 
Law Schools Annual Conference in Washington, D.C., the Canadian Law and Economics 
Association Annual Meeting in Toronto, Canada, the National Business Law Scholars Conference, 
and the Law and Society Annual Meeting. I am also grateful for the thoughtful contributions of the 
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW editorial staff. All errors are my own. 
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Finally, this Article deconstructs the theory of self-regulation that characterizes financial 
markets regulation. After reviewing the benefits and weaknesses of the self-regulatory 
approach, this Article explores the emerging New Governance paradigm. Drawing from the 
New Governance literature and internal corporate governance reforms employed by venture 
capital and private equity firms, regulators, and federal prosecutors, this Article proposes that 
regulators appoint an independent, third party board observer or monitor to CCPs’ board of 
directors. The appointed board observer or monitor will endeavor to ensure the safety and 
soundness of CCPs’ risk-management decisions and that their risk-taking decisions are 
consistent with the public’s interest in mitigating systemic risk concerns.     
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INTRODUCTION 
Should bankers regulate bankers?1 For more than two centuries, 
legislators, academics, and commentators have passionately debated the 
promise and the peril of permitting financial intermediaries2 to regulate 
their own activities.3 In recent years, an escalating scandal involving a 
critical interest rate benchmark has revived the self-regulation debate.4 
In early 2008, investigative journalists released reports alleging that 
commercial banks manipulated the calculation of the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR)—one of the world’s most significant interest rate 
benchmarks.5 The British Bankers’ Association (BBA), a prestigious 
international banking organization, developed LIBOR in the 1980s to 
offer member banks a comprehensive view of the rates at which banks 
                                                     
1. Landon Thomas Jr., Trade Group for Bankers Regulates a Key Rate, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2012, 
at B1 (“If there is one thing that the escalating [London Interbank Offered Rate] scandal has 
established, it is that bankers have a hard time regulating bankers . . . .”). 
2. Financial intermediaries are privately owned and controlled businesses that provide 
fundamental financial services to financial market participants. Examples of financial intermediaries 
include securities and commodities exchanges, clearinghouses, and commercial depository banks. 
3. This Article explores several interpretations of the theory of self-regulation and various self-
regulatory organizations (SROs). See infra Parts I.D and III.B. In some instances, the notion of self-
regulation connotes an entirely private market regulatory approach and the relevant SROs are not 
subject to external regulation. See infra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. In other contexts, SROs 
organized as private businesses remain subject to a government or external regulator. See infra notes 
71–77 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the regulation of securities and 
commodities exchanges and clearinghouses in the United States, see Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen 
O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
563, 568 (2005); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1457–59 
(1997). 
4. See, e.g., Jacob Gyntelberg & Philip Wooldridge, Interbank rate fixings during the recent 
turmoil, in BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW 59, 70 (Mar. 2008) (concluding that “available data do not 
support the hypothesis that contributor banks manipulated their quotes to profit from positions based 
on fixings”); WORLD ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SURVEYS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 95 (Oct. 2008) (dismissing allegations that banks 
manipulated the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and concluding that the rate “remains an 
accurate measure of a typical creditworthy bank’s marginal cost of unsecured U.S. dollar term 
funding”); Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate, WALL ST. J., 
May 29, 2008, at A1 (arguing that member banks manipulated the average interbank borrowing rates 
calculated by the British Bankers’ Association).  
5. Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 4, at A1.  
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borrow funds from other banks.6 BBA member banks and market 
participants around the world now utilize LIBOR to decide the rates that 
they will apply to various domestic and international financial 
arrangements, including syndicated corporate loans and foreign 
exchange transactions.7 
Financial markets have integrated LIBOR into more than $500 trillion 
of corporate and consumer loans—student loans, home mortgages, 
automobile financing arrangements—and sophisticated derivatives 
transactions.8 For example, LIBOR influences the interest rates applied 
to more than half of variable rate private student loans.9 Consequently, 
LIBOR impacts access to credit for millions of consumers and 
businesses.10 
British and American investigations revealed that bank traders 
colluded to distort the international interest rate benchmark.11 Evidence 
                                                     
6. “The British Bankers’ Association was created in 1919 as a result of the merger of the Central 
Association of Bankers and the Association of English Country Bankers.” British Bankers’ Ass’n, 
Identity Statement, AIM25, http://www.aim25.ac.uk/cgi-bin/vcdf/detail?coll_id=16736&inst_id 
=118&nv1=search&nv2= (last visited Feb. 9, 2013). Originally organized to promote the interests 
of the British banking community, the trade association opened its membership to all banks in the 
United Kingdom in 1972. Id. Today the organization represents the interests of over 200 member 
banks organized around the world. See About Us, BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, 
http://www.bba.org.uk/about-us (last visited Jan. 26, 2013); see also David Enrich, British Banks 
Step Back from Libor Role, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2012, at C1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444180004578018371243449916.html; Thomas, 
supra note 1, at B1 (discussing the history and development of the BBA). Unlike the securities and 
commodities exchanges discussed below, see infra Part II, the BBA is not subject to external, 
government regulation. In the wake of the LIBOR scandal, some critics demand that the British 
government adopt a supervisory framework to regulate the BBA. See Mark Scott, Trade Group 
Seen as Near Conceding Libor Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2012, at B1; Julia Werdigier, British 
Banker Group to Strengthen Libor Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2008, at C2. 
7. See Peter Eavis & Nathaniel Popper, Libor Scandal Shows Many Flaws in Rate-Setting, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/libor-scandal-shows-many-flaws-in-
rate-setting. 
8. Peter Eavis, A Rate Setting Mechanism of Far-Reaching Effects, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, at 
B1; Enrich, supra note 6, at C1; Carrick Mollenkamp, Libor Fog: Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate 
Amid Crisis, WALL ST. J., April 16, 2008, at A13 (estimating that LIBOR influences the valuation 
and interest rates associated with $500 trillion in financial contracts). 
9. Behind the Libor Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2012/07/10/business/dealbook/behind-the-libor-scandal.html; see also Mark Scott, British 
Authorities to Announce Changes in Libor Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2012, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/british-authorities-to-announce-changes-in-libor-
oversight/.   
10. See David Enrich & Dana Cimilluca, Barclays Director Is Latest to Leave, WALL ST. J., July 
26, 2012, at C1.  
11. Azam Ahmed & Ben Protess, As Libor Fault-Finding Grows, It Is Now Every Bank for Itself, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/banks-in-libor-inquiry-are-said-
to-be-trying-to-spread-blame/.  
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suggests that the securities, commodities, and foreign exchange traders 
who were employees of BBA member banks intentionally misreported 
information solicited by the BBA to determine LIBOR.12 By 
manipulating borrowing and lending rates, these traders buttressed their 
firms’ profits on structured derivatives products,13 limited losses on their 
firms’ trading positions,14 and created the appearance that their firms had 
reduced their exposure to commercial risks.15 
A pernicious and persistent tension plagues self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs) such as the BBA. SROs have unique expertise and 
sophistication. They frequently adopt and implement industry standards 
that enhance efficiency and organization within specific sectors of 
financial markets. Similar to other SROs, within the BBA internal 
committees establish and enforce rules governing member banks’ 
activities. SROs are unencumbered by the bureaucratic processes that 
stymie government regulators’ rule-making efforts and, when members 
violate community standards, SROs may act promptly to enforce their 
rules. 
The BBA exemplifies the benefits and concerns that SROs create in 
financial markets. Prior to the rate-fixing scandal, commentators 
celebrated the BBA for developing an international interest rate 
benchmark.16 LIBOR offers a critical tool that reduces transaction costs 
and mitigates information asymmetries in the calculation of lending 
rates.17 
BBA member banks’ manipulation of LIBOR, however, illustrates the 
intransigent conflicts of interest that plague self-governing financial 
institutions. Members’ incentives frequently diverge from SROs’ 
                                                     
12. The Foreign Exchange and Money Markets Committee of the BBA is responsible for the 
design and governance of LIBOR and for scrutinizing data from contributor banks. See Governance, 
BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, http://www.bbalibor.com/governance (last visited Jan. 27, 2013); The 
Basics, BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/the-basics (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2013). The committee determines LIBOR by aggregating interest rate information 
gathered from a panel of representative banks. Id. The resulting figure reflects a typical bank’s 
marginal cost of borrowing unsecured funds, meaning the rate at which banks are willing to lend 
unsecured funds to other banks. Id. Currently, the BBA calculates and publishes LIBOR each 
business day. Id. 
13. Megan Murphy, Brooke Masters & Caroline Binham, Probe Reveals Scale of Libor Abuse, 
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at B4.  
14. Ahmed & Protess, supra note 11.  
15. Eduardo Porter, The Spreading Scourge of Corporate Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, 
at B1. 
16. See Karen Krebsbach, The Inside Track, Policy, Players, and Politics: Repairing Libor’s 
Credibility Crisis, U.S. BANKER, July 2008, at 14. 
17. Thomas, supra note 1, at B1.  
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regulatory objectives. In an effort to increase profits or to avoid losses, 
members may disregard an SRO’s regulatory policies and violate the 
trade organization’s rules. In the absence of policies that effectively 
mitigate members’ conflicts of interest, self-serving behavior may lead 
to regulatory failures, creating significant costs, triggering market 
disruptions, and leading to harmful spillover effects that impact the 
global economy.18 Market participants’ manipulation of LIBOR, for 
example, continued unchecked for several years and impacted financial 
arrangements around the world; arguably, the lack of external or 
government regulatory oversight enabled market participants to conceal 
their deceit.19 
The LIBOR scandal is salacious, in part because bankers acted to 
increase or preserve profits on over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
trades—financial transactions that many commentators blame for the 
onset of the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression.20 The 
complexity of the derivatives transactions linked to adjustable rate prime 
and subprime mortgages severely weakened the solvency of many 
systemically significant financial institutions and evoked a public outcry 
for financial markets reform. Barclays Bank recently admitted that 
several of its traders manipulated LIBOR in order to ensure the 
profitability of the bank’s derivatives trades and agreed to pay $450 
                                                     
18. See generally Eavis & Popper, supra note 7. 
19. See Werdigier, supra note 6, at C2; Macey & O’Hara, supra note 3, at 596 (distinguishing 
between SROs subject to government regulations and SROs that are not subject to external 
regulation). 
20. See generally Paul Krugman, The Third Depression, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010, at A19 
(predicting that the recent financial crisis created depression-era like conditions). For a discussion of 
claims that derivatives were a catalyst that precipitated the recent financial crisis, see Kristin N. 
Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 
167, 193 (2011). A derivative is a financial instrument that derives its value from an external asset, 
described as a reference asset or an underlying asset. Id.; Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing 
Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 681–82 (2002); Willa E. Gibson, 
Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures?: The Inadequacies of Applying the Traditional 
Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379, 383–88 (1999). An 
underlying asset or reference asset can be a cash instrument, such as a treasury security, a stock, a 
bond, or a commodity. Johnson, supra, at 193. A derivative agreement may also reference a 
calculated rate such as an interest rate or a foreign exchange rate. Id. The value of the derivative 
depends on the value of the underlying asset, while the value of the underlying asset is determined 
based on fluctuations in market pricing. Id. Derivative contracts may take the form of privately 
negotiated agreements or the contracts can be traded on a derivatives exchange. Id. Commentators 
describe the former type of arrangements as over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives because these 
instruments do not trade on an exchange but instead trade on non-centralized markets that are 
comprised of numerous privately negotiated transactions. Id.; Feder, supra, at 681–82; Gibson, 
supra, at 383–88. 
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million to settle prosecutors’ claims against the bank.21 
While federal prosecutors continue to pursue the traders and banks 
involved in the BBA LIBOR scandal, Congress has taken steps to 
address the lack of regulation in OTC derivatives markets. Ironically, 
recently adopted legislation introduces a self-regulatory framework that 
is strikingly similar to other self-regulatory approaches that have failed 
to detect fraud, prevent manipulation, or effectively prosecute violations 
of federal securities laws. 
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act22 (“Dodd-Frank Act” or the “Act”) requires financial 
market participants to register and clear OTC derivatives transactions 
through federally authorized registered clearinghouses.23 The landmark 
federal legislation aims to increase transparency,24 enhance efficiency, 
and reduce the likelihood that trading in OTC markets will disrupt 
broader financial market stability or create the types of systemic risk25 
that threatened global financial markets from 2007 to 2010.26 
In addition to mitigating systemic risks, Title VII imposes clearing 
requirements in OTC markets in order to engender the economic benefits 
of exchanges and clearinghouses. Organizational literature suggests that 
these benefits include reduced transaction and agency costs and 
                                                     
21. See Ben Protess & Mark Scott, Barclays Settles Regulators’ Claims Over Manipulation of 
Key Rates, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/barclays-said-to-
settle-regulatory-claims-over-benchmark-manipulation; see also Press Release, U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Barclay’s to Pay $200 Million Penalty for Attempted 
Manipulation of and False Reporting Concerning LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark Interest Rates 
(June 27, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12 (“According 
to the Order, Barclays, through its traders and employees responsible for determining the Bank’s 
LIBOR and Euribor submissions (submitters), attempted to manipulate and made false reports 
concerning both benchmark interest rates to benefit the Bank’s derivatives trading positions by 
either increasing its profits or minimizing its losses. This conduct occurred regularly and was 
pervasive.”).  
22. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 41 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 
Dodd-Frank Act]. 
23. Id. §§ 701–74 (codified in scattered sections of 7 and 15 U.S.C.). 
24. Id.  
25. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008) (integrating the factors used 
in various definitions of systemic and suggesting the following working definition for systemic risk: 
“the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic 
or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant 
losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its 
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility”). 
26. Edward Wyatt, To Cushion Against Losses, Fed Considers Raising Capital Requirements for 
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2011, at B3. 
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enhanced market stability.27 Transitioning to a formal market with 
centralized clearing and settlement is not, however, without 
disadvantages. The clearinghouses’ ownership and internal governance 
structure raise noteworthy concerns. 
Similar to the structure of many SROs, OTC derivatives 
clearinghouses are directly controlled by a small group of elite banking 
institutions.28 The membership lists of the five clearinghouses currently 
authorized by federal regulators to execute OTC derivatives transactions 
are comprised almost exclusively of banks, bank holding companies, or 
their affiliates.29 The significant players in the OTC derivatives 
markets—JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman 
Sachs, HSBC, and Morgan Stanley—are also the largest and controlling 
stakeholders of several of the authorized clearinghouses.30 The 
similarities between the ownership structure of the BBA and recently 
authorized OTC derivatives clearinghouses suggest that OTC derivatives 
clearinghouses are susceptible to the same conflicts of interest 
implicated in the LIBOR scandal. 
When Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, ten large banks 
served as the dealers for ninety percent of OTC derivatives 
transactions.31 These banks earned $60 billion dollars in fees for their 
role as dealers.32 As a result of their controlling ownership and voting 
positions, large dealers will have the authority to limit the volume of 
transactions executed on clearinghouse platforms and affect the 
percentage of transactions that become subject to Title VII’s clearing 
mandate. Because these large dealers generate staggering revenue from 
OTC derivatives trades, they will face significant conflicts of interest 
when deciding whether to permit smaller dealers to become 
clearinghouse members. Large dealers will also face conflicts when 
determining trade eligibility policies. 
Given clearinghouse members’ self-interests and anticompetitive 
incentives, academics and regulators have expressed concerns that 
clearinghouses’ risk management policies may undermine federal efforts 
to make OTC derivatives markets more transparent and to mitigate 
                                                     
27. For a discussion of the ownership structure of clearinghouses, see infra Part II.B.  
28. See discussion infra Part I.B.   
29. See INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, ICE CLEAR EUROPE-CLEARING MEMBERS (Dec. 13, 
2012), available at https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_europe/ 
ICE_Clear_Europe_Clearing_Member_List.pdf. 
30. Gretchen Morgenson, It’s Not Over Until It’s in the Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010, at B1. 
31. Id.  
32. Id.  
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systemic risk concerns. Consequently, some commentators conclude that 
introducing clearinghouses may only shift risks in the OTC derivatives 
market from the balance sheets of individual market participants to the 
balance sheet of a centralized institution. Under this analysis, 
clearinghouses may well emerge as the next class of institutions to bear 
the moniker “too big to fail.” 
This Article argues that employing a traditional, one-size-fits-all, self-
regulatory solution in OTC derivatives market fails to address the 
complexities of governance in sophisticated, concentrated financial 
markets. Part I explores economic organization theory and describes the 
transaction and agency costs that motivate individual businesses and 
certain industries to organize production in a particular manner. 
Notwithstanding the economic benefits that result from industry-wide 
collaboration, the absence of effective governance policies that ensure 
fairness and open access to markets may engender anti-competitive 
practices. In the case of OTC derivatives, these negative practices may 
have deleterious consequences. 
Part II analyzes the application of the principles of organization 
theory to the activities and recent regulation in the OTC derivatives 
markets. The application reveals disconcerting conflicts of interest. Part 
III contends that a modified approach to self-regulation articulated by 
New Governance theorists alleviates many of the concerns that plague 
self-regulating markets. 
Part IV proposes that regulators adopt lessons from the theory of New 
Governance and modify the self-regulatory approach in OTC derivatives 
markets to better address conflicts of interest within the clearinghouse 
governance framework. This Part contends that appointing an expert, 
independent third party to serve as a corporate monitor or board observer 
on clearinghouse boards enhances critical risk-management decision-
making, mitigates systemic risk, preserves the integrity of financial 
markets, and protects third parties from the negative spillover effects of 
future financial crises. 
I.  ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION THEORY PROMOTES THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIALIZED FIRMS 
While legal and finance theory frequently explores the costs and 
benefits of corporations’ internal governance structures, few theorists 
have examined the organizational approaches that nontraditional firms 
adopt. As the LIBOR scandal demonstrates, corporate governance 
strategies have salience for various types of business organizations. The 
well-known conflicts of interest that emerge in conventional 
corporations also affect the decision-making frameworks employed by 
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businesses that serve as SROs. This Part explores the economic rationale 
for widely-adopted corporate governance mechanisms and their 
application in the context of financial market SROs. 
Section A of this Part compares the theoretical justification for a 
firm’s decision to integrate production with the firm’s decision to 
acquire inputs in a competitive market. Section B argues that the 
decision to integrate or outsource production influences the governance 
structure that a firm adopts. Industry participants may, as Section C 
posits, collaborate to engineer a solution to their demand for a common 
input or service; they may collectively contribute to a joint venture, such 
as an SRO, that governs market transactions. Section D applies the 
theory of the firm to the development of SROs and contends that 
securities and commodities exchanges and clearinghouses engender 
valuable economic benefits and perform a critical role in the regulation 
of financial markets. 
A.  The Theory of the Firm Reveals the Contours of Allocational 
Efficiency 
For almost one hundred years, economists have studied the 
organization of economic activity and markets.33 The “theory of the 
firm” engenders an important body of literature that explores 
organizational, structural, and governance strategies.34 In The Nature of 
the Firm, Ronald Coase examines a firm’s decision to vertically 
integrate production (producing an input) instead of outsourcing 
production (acquiring the same input from the market).35 According to 
Coase, a firm’s decision whether to “make” or “buy” assets involves a 
tradeoff between two distinct governance costs: agency costs (the costs 
of overseeing production) and transaction costs (the costs of acquiring an 
asset).36 Coase concludes that an optimal allocation of economic activity 
occurs when the cost of making an additional input equals the cost of 
                                                     
33. See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 1–11 (1921) (exploring the 
theory of market risk and uncertainty and the organization of economic activity).  
34. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972); Margaret M. Blair, Erin O’Hara O’Connor & 
Gregg Kirchhoefer, Outsourcing, Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm, 2011 BYU L. REV. 263, 
266 (2011); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 278 (1999); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical 
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 
311 (1978); Todd R. Zenger & William S. Hesterly, The Disaggregation of Corporations: Selective 
Intervention, High-Powered Incentives, and Molecular Units, 8 ORG. SCI. 209, 212–16 (1997). 
35. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
36. Id. at 390–92.  
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buying the input,37 or there is a balance between transaction costs and 
agency costs.38 
Firms that decide to integrate production incur agency costs.39 In the 
1930s, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means explained that agency costs 
arise in modern corporations as a consequence of the classic principal-
agent problem.40 According to Berle and Means, when shareholders 
delegate authority over production to managers, shareholders’ interests 
as owners may diverge from the interests of directors and executive 
officers who are hired to manage the firm’s production. Shareholders 
cannot ensure that managers will prioritize the firm’s interests ahead of 
their own self-interests. Managers may maximize their own happiness, 
shirk, underperform, or even steal.41 
In a critical contribution to the theoretical framework, Michael Jensen 
and William Meckling posit that agency costs arise because owners must 
employ governance strategies to identify, monitor, and mitigate 
managers’ self-interested or slothful behavior.42 A firm might, for 
example, commission an external accountant to conduct an independent 
audit of the firm’s financials to limit shirking and stealing.43 Agency 
costs create additional expenditures that increase the firm’s costs of 
production.44 
                                                     
37. Id. at 394 (“Naturally, a point must be reached where the costs of organising an extra 
transaction within the firm are equal to the costs involved in carrying out the transaction in the open 
market, or, to the costs of organising by another entrepreneur.”). 
38. Id. at 245–46. 
39. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (arguing that “contractual 
relations are the essence of a firm,” and that a firm is a “nexus for a set of contracting relationship 
among individuals”) (emphasis omitted). 
40. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 4–5 (1932). 
41. See id. at 5–7. 
42. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39, at 308 (noting that because owners and managers seek to 
maximize their utility, the owner “can limit divergences from his interest by establishing 
appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant 
activities of the agent”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in 
Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 812–13 (2006) (describing the divergence between 
managers and shareholders’ interests); Bernard S. Sharfman, Enhancing the Efficiency of Board 
Decision Making: Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis of 2008, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 813, 
840–41 (2009) (explaining how managers’ pursuit of their self-interests contributed to the recent 
financial crisis); Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why 
Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 674–75 
(2003) (exploring the asymmetries between the interests of owners and managers). 
43. See ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 2 (2012). 
44. See id. at 183. 
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Transaction costs arise when a firm acquires assets at prevailing 
market prices.45 Buying inputs exposes firms to market uncertainties 
such as fluctuations in market prices and the availability of supply.46 
According to Oliver Williamson’s celebrated analysis, two factors 
complicate open-market transactions: bounded rationality and 
opportunism.47 The first factor, bounded rationality, describes the 
asymmetries of information, cognitive limits, and the limits on market 
participants’ time and ability to process information.48 The second 
factor, opportunism, describes market participants’ propensity to act in 
their own self-interest to the detriment of others.49 Market participants 
act opportunistically to mitigate their exposure to market risk.50 As a 
result of these limitations, for example, a firm may pay a premium for 
inputs that are available at a lower price elsewhere in the market. To 
address these concerns, market participants adopt various governance 
solutions. 
B.  Production Decisions Require Firms to Evaluate Transaction 
Costs and Agency Costs 
Firms adopt several governance solutions to address agency and 
transaction costs. To reduce agency costs, firms generally implement an 
internal governance method. The most common methods involve 
implementing a hierarchical decision-making process, electing a board 
of directors to make strategic decisions, and appointing executive 
officers to manage the daily operations of the business. Within the firm, 
the board of directors appoints executive officers to monitor lower level 
employees. State law endows directors with the authority to hire and fire 
executive officers. To minimize directors and officers’ incentives to 
                                                     
45. Coase, supra note 35, at 394–95.  
46. Id. at 391–92. 
47. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 245–46 (1979).  
48. See generally id. (describing the limits of bounded rationality). 
49. Id. at 234 n.3. 
50. See Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk 
Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 63–64 (2011) (describing 
“market risk as the potential for a dramatic change in the value of an asset class, such as a sudden 
decline in the value of equity securities traded on a national stock exchange, or a sharp spike in the 
price of a commodity, such as oil or gold”). See generally HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 252 (6th ed. 1999); BASEL 
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL 
ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS (2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbs119.pdf (describing methods of measuring market risk). 
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shirk and steal, shareholders enter into contractual arrangements that 
create fiduciary duties, outline compensation arrangements, or establish 
other details that govern directors and officers’ relationships with the 
firm. 
Firms that purchase inputs similarly depend on long-term contracts to 
mitigate costs.51 Parties can reduce the uncertainty of market 
transactions through contractual arrangements, agreeing ex ante on price, 
quality, quantity, or other material transaction terms.52 Contracts are, 
however, often incomplete and, ex post, firms may discover that an 
agreement fails to address unanticipated changes or recently identified 
material terms.53 
Contractual governance may also offer limited relief if a firm invests 
in a transaction-specific asset and the invested resources are not easily 
redeployed.54 After a firm invests in a transaction-specific asset, the firm 
becomes vulnerable to the opportunistic behavior of rent-seeking trading 
partners.55 Opportunistic trading partners may create a classic hold-up 
problem by demanding additional fees and putting the squeeze on a firm 
that has invested in a transaction-specific asset and incurred sunk costs.56 
Consider, for example, a securities brokerage firm’s decision to create 
or acquire securities trading software. The firm earns fees for executing 
clients’ securities transactions. Under the terms of its arrangement with 
clients, the securities brokerage firm must cease trading if prices for 
designated securities move beyond a predetermined range. A specialized 
software program enables the securities brokerage firm to monitor their 
traders’ compliance with clients’ complex instructions. 
                                                     
51. Blair, O’Connor & Kirchhoefer, supra note 34, at 270 n.14 (discussing the “contractual nature 
(voluntary exchange) of the relationships of participants in a firm”); Blair & Stout, supra note 34, at 
250 (discussing how contracts reduce agency costs); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426–28 (1989) (exploring the application of the 
“nexus of contracts” theory); see Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 34, at 777; William W. Bratton, 
Dividends, Noncontractibility, and Corporate Law, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 409, 410 (1997); Jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 39, at 310 (arguing that “[c]ontractual relations are the essence of a firm,” and 
that a firm is a “nexus for a set of contracting relationship among individuals”) (emphasis omitted); 
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-
Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1624–25 (2001). 
52. Thomas F. McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production and Work Practices for 
Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 135, 148–49 (2004).  
53. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational 
Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1008 (1998) (“In any organization . . . the familiar triad 
of contracting problems, uncertainty, complexity, and opportunism, precludes the organization and 
its agents from entering into the complete contract necessary to prevent shirking by the latter.”). 
54. Williamson, supra note 47, at 257. 
55. Id. at 234. 
56. Id. at 240. 
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The firm faces the dilemma of either developing its own software or 
acquiring a license from a software developer. The benefits of either 
approach are similar; the costs, however, are distinguishable. While 
developing proprietary software creates agency costs, purchasing 
commercially distributed software creates transaction costs. 
If a securities firm engineers software, it incurs research and 
development costs and must carefully monitor employees to avoid theft 
or abuse of the proprietary program. If the securities firm acquires a 
license for a software program distributed by a commercial software 
developer, the firm must also invest in reconfiguring its operating 
system to ensure that it is compatible with the program. What happens if 
the developer upgrades the software program and demands fees that 
exceed competitive market prices for similar programs? The securities 
firm will be reluctant to lose its initial investment in the recently 
acquired software. The firm will also be reticent to spend additional 
funds to acquire software from another developer and incur the costs to 
reconfigure its operating system to make it compatible with the second 
developer’s software. Aware of the securities brokerage firm’s aversion 
to suffer the loss of the sunk costs and incur the additional costs of 
transitioning to a different software, the developer of the software 
already implemented on the brokerage firm’s systems can hold out and 
demand above market fees for upgrades or updates to its software 
program. 
Before investing in the software and reconfiguring its systems, the 
firm faced a competitive market. After its initial investment and 
expending the resources to acquire one developer’s software, the firm is 
vulnerable to opportunism; if the software developer markets upgrades, 
discontinues, or materially alters its existing software, it may extract 
excessive fees from the early adopters of its software. In many instances, 
integration and acquisition both present significant costs, and contractual 
governance methods may not address concerns regarding access to 
critical and rapidly evolving inputs. Fortunately, markets offer an 
alternative governance solution: a specialized firm that produces these 
critical inputs through collaborative institutional design. 
C.  Industries Endow Specialized Firms with Property Rights 
When there is a general demand for a common input, market 
participants may collaborate to organize a single firm (the specialized 
firm) to produce the common input.57 Market participants collaborate 
                                                     
57. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 51, at 1422–24; Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property 
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and assign property rights to the specialized firm, granting the 
specialized firm a residual right to control the assets of the joint 
enterprise. Specialized firms develop a competitive advantage by 
producing the input more efficiently and reducing the costs of 
production for participating members.58 
Notwithstanding their heterogeneous commercial interests, market 
participants share a homogenous interest in the success of the specialized 
firm. Co-owners create an internal governance arrangement, adopting 
bylaws, implementing a hierarchical decision-making process, electing 
directors, and appointing officers to govern the specialized firm.59 
Consequently, the specialized firm alleviates market participants’ 
transaction and agency costs and overcomes hold-up concerns. In 
financial markets, the creation of SROs such as exchanges and 
clearinghouses illustrates this type of collaborative industry effort. 
D.  Self-Regulating Organizations Illustrate the Development of 
Specialized Firms in Financial Markets 
For hundreds of years, financial market participants have organized 
exchanges and clearinghouses.60 These institutions illustrate the promise 
                                                     
Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1120 (1990) (explaining that firms matter 
when parties must make specific investments, exploring the impossibility of drafting complete 
contracts, and noting that integration of production within a firm reduces the opportunistic behavior 
and holdup problems that can arise in such circumstances); Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, 
Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 24, 26 (1991); Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm 
Revisited, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 77 (1998).  
58. See Hart & Moore, supra note 57, at 1120; Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 57, at 77. 
59. See Hart & Moore, supra note 57, at 1120; Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1459 (citing Broadside 
of Securities Trading Rules, September 1791, reprinted in WALTER WERNER & STEVEN T. SMITH, 
WALL STREET app. C, at 190–91 (1991)) (describing a “set of rules adopted by New York 
stockbrokers in 1791, the earliest surviving organizational document for the New York stock 
market, was concerned principally with defining the terms of contracts and the procedures for their 
performance”); Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and its 
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1022–26 (2005) (illustrating the rich history of 
SROs and highlighting the NYSE’s history, which dates back to an informal agreement between 
twenty-four brokers signed under a buttonwood tree on Wall Street). See generally R.C. Michie, 
Development of Stock Markets, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 
662, 662 (Peter Newman, Murray Milgate & John Eatwell eds., 1992) (describing the development 
of financial markets organized around specialized intermediaries as early as the seventeenth 
century). 
60. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 553–54 (6th ed. 2009) 
(noting that “[s]ecurities broker regulation can be traced back to the thirteenth century”); Jonathan 
Lurie, Private Associations, Internal Regulation and Progressivism: The Chicago Board of Trade, 
1880–1923, as a Case Study, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 219 (1972). Community-based 
regulations governed commercial trading in the earliest African kingdoms, and in ancient Grecian, 
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of endowing specialized firms with property rights. Coase’s theorem 
suggests that firms vertically integrate trading activities unless 
transaction costs are significant.61 In the case of securities and 
commodities markets, transactions engender substantial costs.62 Trading 
requires continuous monitoring of securities and commodities prices and 
information that affects pricing. Tracking the market often requires 
subscribing to expensive data streaming services and buying 
sophisticated investment research or analysts’ reports.63 Firms also incur 
legal and administrative costs, including documentation, clearing, and 
settlement costs.64 
Development of trading platforms further increases costs. Firms must 
create, acquire, or license the intellectual property necessary to engineer 
proprietary trading platforms.65 Relying on the market to provide a 
trading platform is similarly costly.66 Incomplete contracts for access to 
trading platforms may create incentives for opportunistic behavior in 
financial markets and hold-up problems may prevail. 
Exchanges and clearinghouses reflect the attributes of specialized 
firms. Exchanges and clearinghouses centralize the execution, clearing, 
and settlement of market transactions.67 In addition to increasing 
liquidity,68 reducing the costs of capital,69 and encouraging investment 
                                                     
Egyptian, and Roman civilizations. For a description of the influence of ancient civilizations on 
western law generally, see Robin Bradley Kar, Western Legal Prehistory: Reconstructing the 
Hidden Origins of Western Law and Civilization, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1499 (2012). Merchant 
guilds and religious fraternities in Medieval Europe organized self-regulating regimes. Saule T. 
Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
665, 671 (2010). In Japan, as early as the 1600s, rice exchanges emerged, institutionalizing a self-
regulatory approach in the rice and rice futures markets. Mark D. West, Private Ordering at the 
World’s First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2574, 2580 (2000). 
61. Coase, supra note 35, at 397. 
62. Macey & O’Hara, supra note 3, at 568, at 568–69; Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, 
Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. Rev. 315, 326 
(1985); Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Transactions Costs, and Investor Welfare: Is A Motley Fool 
Born Every Minute?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 791, 797 (1997). 
63. Macey & O’Hara, supra note 3, at 568. 
64. Id. at 568. 
65. Id. 
66. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 51, at 1423; George S. Geis, The Space Between 
Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99, 110 (2009) (explaining that “it is expensive (and 
ultimately impossible) to prevent parties from taking self-interested actions when they are given 
control over other people’s money”). 
67. Johnson, supra note 20, at 235. 
68. Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC’s National 
Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 886 (1981) (defining liquidity (as the term is employed in 
the securities markets) as a condition that enables investors to dispose of or purchase securities at 
established prices with ease). Liquidity describes the feasibility of selling an asset. When there are 
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and innovation, these institutions aggregate and disseminate trading data, 
alleviating transaction costs for collaborating members.70 More 
importantly, exchanges and clearinghouses serve a governing role, 
introducing a regulatory framework in which market participants govern 
themselves. 
1.  Financial Markets Employ a Self-Regulatory Framework 
More than a century before the federal government enacted a formal 
securities and commodities regulatory framework, exchanges and 
clearinghouses occupied a central role in market regulation.71 When 
Congress adopted federal regulations governing securities markets in the 
1930s, the legislation expressly authorized exchanges and 
clearinghouses to serve in this self-governing manner; the early 
legislation embraces the notion that market participants may serve a 
primary role in governing securities and commodities market activities.72 
Congress authorized these privately owned exchanges and 
clearinghouses to develop and enforce disciplinary policies governing 
market participants’ behavior.73 SROs retained significant autonomy to 
determine the fundamental elements of their operating policies and 
governance structure.74 
                                                     
many buyers and sellers engaged in a significant volume of transactions involving an asset, market 
participants describe the asset as liquid. Based on the volume of transactions involving the asset, the 
value of asset is readily determinable. Yair Listokin, Taxation and Liquidity, 120 YALE L.J. 1682, 
1682 (2011) (defining liquidity and describing the benefits of liquid asset markets). 
69. Comment, A Role for the 10b-5 Private Action, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 460, 461 n.10 (1981). 
70. Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets As Regulators: A Survey, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1239, 1249 (2007). 
71. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1457 (“For most of their history . . . exchanges have been the 
primary regulators of securities markets. They mediated between buyers and sellers and between 
issuers and investors. They determined how bargains would be struck and performed, what 
standards of financial responsibility brokers must meet, and what information listed companies must 
disclose to investors. The rules supplemented generally applicable rules of contract 
agency . . . negotiable instruments, and so on.”). See generally Lurie, supra note 60. Following a 
government bond scandal, members organized the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1792. 
Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered 
Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 159 (2008). After the adoption of the 
Securities Exchange Act, members created the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 
in 1936. Id. For regulations governing securities exchanges, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
§ 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2006).  
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k)(1). 
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(h), 78s. 
74. Section 19(b) requires SROs to file proposed rules with the SEC for review and approval. 15 
U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1). Without the SEC’s approval, proposed rules may not become effective. 15 
U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2). In addition, under Section 19(d)(2), the SEC has the authority to review 
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In exchange for voluntary submission to federal oversight, Sections 6 
and 19 of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 7 of the Commodities 
Future Modernization Act empower federal regulatory agencies to 
regulate SROs.75 Specifically, the statutes authorize the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) to monitor SROs’ rulemaking processes to ensure 
that SRO regulations are consistent with federal regulations and that 
SROs vigorously enforce these rules.76 
While there is no universally agreed upon definition, financial 
markets scholars use the term “self-regulation” to describe a dual-tiered 
regulatory approach.77 The self-regulatory framework employed in 
financial markets rests on several critical assumptions. First, the self-
regulatory framework assumes that SROs adopt innovative, timely 
regulatory solutions. Second, the framework presumes that SROs 
implement and enforce rules consistent with federal regulations and the 
public’s interest in market integrity and stability. Finally, the framework 
assumes that the person or group that exercises decision-making 
authority for the SRO will prioritize these regulatory norms. 
Consistent with the first two assumptions, SROs independently 
introduce and enforce critical regulation. As early as the mid-nineteenth 
century, for example, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) required 
issuers that listed their securities on the exchange to disclose material 
information regarding the company’s financial performance.78 When 
federal legislators adopted statutes regulating securities market 
transactions nearly one hundred years later, Congress instituted a 
mandatory disclosure-oriented regime that paralleled the NYSE’s 
                                                     
disciplinary penalties and, upon complying with notice and procedural requirements, may affirm, 
modify, remand, or set aside the penalties. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)–(e). SRO disciplinary actions are now 
subject to the SEC’s “plenary” review. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803, 804 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005). 
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78s; Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 § 105(c), 7 U.S.C. § 2 
(2006).  
76. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78s; 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2. 
77. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling Self-
Regulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1075 (2005); Karmel, supra 
note 71, at 197. See generally, Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: 
The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1007, 1050–51 (1990); Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1464–65.   
78. Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1461–62 (“Stock exchange rules have long been concerned with 
the validity of shares traded on the exchange. . . . By 1869, the Exchange had instituted a listing 
requirement aimed principally at assuring that market participants had accurate information about 
each company’s capitalization . . . .”). 
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approach.79 SRO rules and federal regulations continue to rely on 
disclosure to provide an effective regulatory tool.80 
The NYSE’s mandatory disclosure requirements ameliorate 
asymmetries of information, lowering transaction costs and the costs of 
capital and enhancing market efficiency.81 The disclosure requirements 
also reduce market manipulation and militate against opportunistic 
behavior, improving the reputation of exchanges and clearinghouses and 
securing their role in the federal regulatory framework. 
The third—and potentially most problematic—assumption suggests 
that the governing authority of SROs embrace their role as enforcers of 
public policy. While SRO regulations often complement federal and 
state regulatory efforts, SROs are neither government agencies nor 
proxies of regulators.82 The difficulty with self-regulation lies in the 
presumption that regulated entities continuously introduce regulation 
that aligns market participants’ behavior with the public’s interest in 
financial markets regulation. 
Deferring to SROs allows government regulators to benefit from SRO 
boards of directors and governing committees’ sophisticated 
understanding of conventional and exotic financial instruments.83 The 
monitoring and enforcement policies that SRO governing authorities 
adopt do not, however, always align with federal policies or regulatory 
goals. In response, regulators have chastised SROs for delayed or weak 
enforcement efforts.84 In recent years, certain foundational changes in 
the business organization of SROs have permanently transformed the 
nature of the relationship between federal regulators and financial 
                                                     
79. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 78m (2006). 
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 78m. 
81. Increasing liquidity reduces transaction costs by enabling buyers and sellers to identify 
counterparties quickly and with ease. This reduces the risks associated with holding and trading 
shares, increasing market participants’ willingness to trade. See generally, Macey and Kanda, supra 
note 77, at 1019–20. By aggregating and continuously revealing bid-and-ask pricing data, 
exchanges reduce investment research costs, as well as asymmetries of information. Daniel R. 
Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
119, 121 n.9, 123 (1987). 
82. Nagy, supra note 59, at 1007. Unlike the lengthy, expensive, bureaucratic processes that 
federal agencies employ, SROs’ rule-making and enforcement processes often involve fewer 
administrative and political hurdles. See Frank D’Souza, Nan S. Ellis & Lisa M. Fairchild, 
Illuminating the Need for Regulation in Dark Markets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC 
Derivatives, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 473, 516 n.181 (2010). 
83. See Yesenia Cervantes, “Fin Rah!” . . . A Welcome Change: Why The Merger Was Necessary 
To Preserve U.S. Market Integrity, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 829, 834, 856–57 (2008). 
84. See id. at 838–42; Dombalagian, supra note 77, at 1087; Nan S. Ellis, Lisa M. Fairchild & 
Harold D. Fletcher, The NYSE Response to Specialist Misconduct: An Example of the Failure of 
Self-Regulation, 7 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 102, 105–07 (2009); Karmel, supra note 71, at 164. 
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market SROs. 
2.  The Dynamic of Clearinghouse and Exchange Ownership Evolves 
from Cooperative to Corporate 
Three shifts in the organizational structure of financial markets 
demonstrate an increasing conflict between SROs’ commercial goals and 
their participation in market regulation. These shifts—changes in the 
ownership structure of exchanges and clearinghouses, technological 
developments, and increased competition—may undermine the efficacy 
of self-regulation in financial markets. 
First, exchanges and clearinghouses have traditionally been organized 
as cooperatives or private clubs.85 In the last decade, the member firms 
that organized large public exchanges and clearinghouses voted to 
demutualize these businesses, converting them from non-profit 
cooperatives to private business. In addition, the members of the 
exchanges and clearinghouses registered their equity shares with the 
SEC for sale in public offerings, allowing a broad base of shareholders 
to publicly trade their ownership interests in the exchanges and 
clearinghouses.86 Today, securities exchanges and clearinghouses are 
international public corporations with freely transferable equity shares 
held by a global body of shareholders.87 
Second, technological advances have displaced traditional trade 
execution strategies.88 Domestically and internationally, trading venues 
                                                     
85. Some early commodities clearinghouses were established with government assistance. See, 
e.g., West, supra note 60, at 2582–85 (describing the Japanese eighth Tokugawa shogun’s role in 
creating a market for rice futures). Market participants collaborated to form the gentlemens’ clubs 
that evolved into modern exchanges and clearinghouses. See, e.g., The New York Stock Exchange, 
NYSE EURONEXT, http://www.nyx.com/en/who-we-are/history/new-york (last visited Jan. 25, 
2013) (describing four stockbrokers’ execution of the Buttonwood Agreement on May 17, 1792, 
and the history of the drafting of the New York Stock & Board Exchange Constitution); see also 
Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1435, 1458 (2008); Karmel, supra note 71, at 152. 
86. See Brummer, supra note 85, at 1451. 
87. Cervantes, supra note 83, at 842–43 (describing the NYSE’s merger with Archipelago 
Holdings Inc., operator of an electronic communications network, the NYSE’s merger with 
Euronext, and the exchange’s transformation from a private, member-managed not-for-profit 
business to an entity whose equity interests are publicly traded, permitting the public to own the 
exchange). 
88. Increasingly, issuers elect to list their securities on an international securities exchange, use 
alternatives such as global depository shares, or cross-list their securities on multiple alternative 
exchanges to reduce the regulatory burdens of listing their securities on an exchange subject to U.S. 
federal securities regulation. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: 
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 944–45 
(1998). The introduction of electronic communication networks (ECNs) and alternative trading 
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have multiplied, increasing the competitors in the securities and 
commodities clearing and settlement markets.89 With the rise of 
electronic communication networks90 and the proliferation of high 
frequency trading, brokers may execute orders for publicly-traded 
securities in milliseconds from any number of trading platforms 
organized in cities around the world.91 Consequently, no single exchange 
or clearinghouse has a dominant role in capital markets. The increasing 
competition among trading venues reduces the ability of any single 
venue to exert regulatory authority over its member institutions.92 
Moreover, technology glitches on premier exchanges have further 
weakened the perception of historically dominant securities and 
commodities exchanges as preferred trading venues. Examples include 
the flash crash of 2010 and NASDAQ, Inc.’s technology failures during 
the sale of Facebook, Inc.’s initial public offering—the largest equity 
offering in the history of U.S. securities markets.93 
Third, the profound consequences of the recent financial crisis 
severely strained the reputation of market participants and SROs in U.S. 
capital markets. Even before the exchanges demutualized, several 
                                                     
systems (ATSs), as well as the decline in the cost of information processing, equities, options, and 
futures, have enabled trading to occur in fractions of seconds and on a virtually uninterrupted basis. 
Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 327, 346 (2010); 
Brummer, supra note 85, at 1460–61. 
89. The increasing number of international trading platforms has altered the exchange industry 
and reflects an increasing preference by issuers to list their securities on exchanges organized in 
foreign jurisdictions. Brummer, supra note 85, at 1460–61. 
90. See Brummer, supra note 85, at 1460; Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the 
Bell Tolls: The Demise of Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 
897 (2008). 
91. Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays in Milliseconds, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2009, 
at A1. 
92. Charles Duhigg, S.E.C. Starts Crackdown on ‘Flash’ Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, at 
B1 (describing the controversial high-frequency trading technique known as “flash orders,” which 
allow traders to view other investors’ orders before they are sent to the wider marketplace).  
93. For information about the flash crash of 2010, see “Flash Crash” Shaved Almost 6 Percent 
off the Dow in a Single Day, WALL ST. J, Aug. 5, 2012, http://professional.wsj.com/article/ 
TPPBTR000020120806e88500021.html; Christopher Matthews, High Frequency Trading: Wall 
Street’s Doomsday Machine?, TIME, Aug. 8, 2012, http://business.time.com/2012/08/08/high-
frequency-trading-wall-streets-doomsday-machine; Ronald D. Orol, ‘Flash Crash’ Rules Made 
Knight Keep Bad Trades; 30% Is Threshold for Getting Trades Cancelled, WALL ST. J, Aug. 7, 
2012, http://www.marketwatch.com/ story/flash-crash-rules-made-knight-keep-bad-trades-2012-08-
07?reflink=MW _news_stmp. For information about NASDAQ, Inc.’s systems failure during the 
launch of the initial public offering of Facebook, Inc., see Michael J. De La Merced, Evelyn M. 
Rusli & Susanne Craig, As Facebook’s Stock Struggles, Fingers Start Pointing, N.Y. TIMES, May 
22, 2012, at B1, and Telis Demos, NASDAQ ‘Embarrassed’ Over Facebook IPO, FIN. TIMES, May 
20, 2012, at C2. 
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challenges—compensation scandals and SROs’ selective enforcement of 
their rules—had sullied the perception of American financial services 
intermediaries.94 With the effects of the recent financial crisis still 
resounding in European credit markets, commentators expressed distrust 
in the American financial services industry, debunking the myth of 
American preeminence. 
These realities undermine the presumption that SROs serve as 
effective market-governing institutions.95 The new ownership structures 
permit shareholders who may have profit maximizing incentives to 
govern exchanges and clearinghouses.96 The diverse and widely 
dispersed shareholders of demutualized exchanges and clearinghouses 
no longer share a homogenous interest in promoting the SROs’ 
governance goals.97 If the board of directors prioritizes earnings or the 
commercial interests of certain classes of shareholders above regulatory 
norms, these institutions may fail to serve as effective governing 
authorities.98 
These weaknesses illustrate the difficulty of relying on self-regulation 
in securities and commodities markets.99 While scholars have engaged in 
                                                     
94. See Dale Arthur Oesterle, Donald Arthur Winslow & Seth C. Anderson, The New York Stock 
Exchange and Its Out Moded Specialist System: Can the Exchange Innovate to Survive?, 17 J. 
CORP. L. 223, 257 (1992). But see David P. Doherty, Arthur S. Okun, Steven F. Korostoff & James 
A. Nofi, The Enforcement Role of the New York Stock Exchange, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 637, 639 
(1991) (dismissing arguments that exchanges slack in their enforcement). See also Ellis, Fairchild & 
Fletcher, supra note 84 (describing the specialists scandal involving trading irregularities in the 
early 2000s resulting in specialist firms being fined a total of $150 million). In the 1990s, an 
executive compensation scandal involving former NYSE CEO Richard Grasso tarnished the public 
and regulators’ perceptions of the exchange as an effective regulator. The Department of Justice 
investigations exposed anti-competitive collusion and price fixing by NYSE specialists and 
numerous examples of SROs’ relaxed enforcement of mandatory disclosure policies. Karmel, supra 
note 71, at 164. 
95. Karmel, supra note 71, at 153; Macey & O’Hara, supra note 3, at 569; see also LARRY E. 
BERGMANN, DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES 
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE: THE U.S. VIEW OF THE ROLE OF REGULATION IN MARKET EFFICIENCY 
(Feb. 10, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch021004leb.htm; Dombalagian, 
supra note 77, at 1145. The 1975 Amendments enhanced the SEC’s oversight of SROs’ rulemaking, 
enforcement, and disciplinary processes. Id. at 1081; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19 (d), (g), 
15 U.S.C. § 78s(d), (g) (2006); see also id. § 78f(a)(3); S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 4 (1975), reprinted in 
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 182–83. 
96. Karmel, supra note 71, at 164 (discussing the excessive executive compensation scandal 
involving excessive distributions to NYSE former CEO Richard Grasso). 
97. Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving The SRO Identity Crisis, 1 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 318 (2007). 
98. Id. at 317 (“SROs are now accused of advocating no interest more keenly than their own 
survival.”). 
99. See generally Dombalagian, supra note 77, at 1143–44; Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock 
Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2543 (2006); Macey & Kanda, supra 
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a robust debate regarding the difficulties of relying on exchanges to 
serve as unbiased regulators in securities and commodities markets, 
there is a dearth of literature examining these issues in the context of 
clearinghouses that settle over-the-counter financial products such as 
OTC derivatives. The next Part explores the federal government’s 
introduction of clearing requirements in the OTC derivatives markets, 
presumptions regarding the market advantages and governance benefits 
that SROs engender, and the challenges that arise when regulators rely 
on this approach. 
II.  MITIGATING SYSTEMIC RISKS REQUIRES REGULATING 
OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS 
Commentators offer several explanations for the events that led to the 
recent financial crisis, including excessive risk taking by financial 
institutions, artificial price inflation in U.S. housing markets (a housing 
price bubble), and the absence of regulation in the market for certain 
complex financial products.100 In July of 2010, Congress enacted Title 
VII of the Dodd-Frank Act in response to critics’ claims that the lack of 
regulation in the OTC derivatives market contributed to the recent 
financial crisis. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act requires market 
participants to register and settle all eligible OTC derivatives 
transactions with authorized clearinghouses.101 Title VII endows 
clearinghouses with a license and empowers them to serve as the 
primary governing authority in OTC derivatives markets.102 
Consequently, the mandatory clearing requirement heightens the 
significance of clearinghouses in financial markets and their prominence 
as a governing authority in the federal regulatory framework. 
There are well-supported reasons for applying the self-regulatory 
approach adopted in securities and commodities markets to the OTC 
derivatives markets. As Part I illustrated, securities and commodities 
                                                     
note 77, at 1023. 
100. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, THIRTEEN BANKERS, 126–30 (2010) (describing 
the rise of the housing bubble); Steven Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 216–19, 233–34 (2010); Steven Schwarcz & Iman Anabtawi, Regulating 
Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1359–61 (2011) 
(attributing the recent financial crisis to risky subprime mortgage lending and “a failure to see both 
the tight interconnectedness among not just banks but also non-bank financial institutions”); Art 
Wilmarth Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the 
Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 982 (2009). 
101. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723(h)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1675 (2010) 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 2011)). 
102. See generally Dodd-Frank Act §§ 701–74 (codified in scattered sections of 7 and 15 U.S.C.). 
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exchanges and clearinghouses engender important economic and 
governance benefits.103 This Part considers the benefits of imposing 
mandatory clearing obligations in OTC derivatives markets. The 
discussion in this Part describes the concerns that arise when privately-
owned clearinghouses are endowed with regulatory authority.104 
The decision to vest primary regulatory authority in clearinghouses 
raises two important sets of questions. The first set of questions explores 
whether this model of governance effectively overcomes the limitations 
of the agency or transaction costs that underscore the theory of the firm. 
The second set of questions explores the conflicts of interest within the 
internal organizational structure of clearinghouses. Large dealers who 
exercise voting authority and economic control over clearinghouses may 
adopt weak risk management policies or engage in exclusionary 
practices when such policies and practices serve their interests. As the 
LIBOR scandal demonstrates, members’ manipulation of a self-
regulating financial institution may create severe consequences that spill 
over and effect innocent third parties throughout the economy. In the 
context of OTC derivatives clearinghouses, the failure to introduce an 
effective governance solution may lead to moral hazard and systemic 
concerns that threaten the stability of global financial markets. 
A.  The Complexity of Financial Innovation and the Severity of the 
Crisis 
A wave of financial innovation marked the twenty year period leading 
to the financial crisis from 2007 to 2010.105 During this period, financial 
product engineers introduced a variety of financial instruments 
specifically designed to avoid the ambit of federal financial markets 
regulation.106 Credit derivatives, described by some critics as “weapons 
of mass destruction,” are among the most infamous financial products 
developed during the late 1990s and early 2000s.107 Similar to traditional 
derivatives arrangements, such as futures, options, forwards, and swaps, 
credit derivatives are contracts that derive their value from the value of 
an asset referenced in the agreement (the “underlying asset”).108 
                                                     
103. See supra notes 61–71. 
104. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 111-517 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
722. 
105. See Johnson, supra note 20, at 196–97. 
106. Id.  
107. See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2003). 
108. For a general description of derivatives, see Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of 
Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 2–6 (1996). 
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There are two classes of credit derivative agreements: collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDSs).109 An 
underwriter creates a CDO by organizing a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV)—a business formed to acquire a portfolio of asset-backed debt 
obligations. The SPV issues debt or equity interests that offer investors 
the right to the profits the portfolio generates.110 CDOs allow SPV 
investors to collectively acquire a diverse basket of debt obligations. By 
purchasing interests in CDOs, investors acquire a fraction of the many 
individual debt products held by the SPV. Consequently, investments in 
CDOs, diversify investors’ risk exposure, spread risk exposure related to 
a basket of debt products across a group of market participants and 
mitigate the impact of any individual debtor’s default for each CDO 
investor. 
CDS agreements mitigate one party’s exposure to the risk that an 
underlying asset will decline in value.111 Market participants purchase 
debt securities issued by local, state, federal, or foreign governments and 
other market participants. Market participants also extend loans to other 
market participants. In a CDS agreement, the party that acquires debt 
securities issued by another firm or extends a loan to a debtor (the 
“protection buyer”) faces the risk that the debtor will default on its 
principal and interest obligations related to the debt instrument (“default 
risk”). The protection buyer enters a CDS contract with a counterparty, 
the protection seller, to mitigate default risk related to the underlying 
asset. In exchange for payment of a periodic fee, the protection seller 
agrees to buy the underlying asset from the protection buyer if certain 
events occur and the underlying asset declines in value.112 
The CDS arrangement only reduces the protection buyer’s risk 
exposure, however, if the protection seller—the counterparty to the 
contract—can satisfy her obligations under the CDS agreement when the 
agreement expires. Commentators describe the risk that a CDS 
counterparty may default on its obligations under the contract as 
counterparty credit risk.113 In the event that both the debtor who issued 
                                                     
109. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (2007). 
110. Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and the Case for 
Federal Merit Review, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 660–61 (2010); Darrell Duffie, Innovations in 
Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial Stability 12 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working 
Paper No. 255, 2008), available at http://www.bis. org/publ/work255.pdf. 
111. See also Johnson, supra note 20, at 197; Seema G. Sharma, Over-the-Counter Derivatives: A 
New Era of Financial Regulation, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 279, 284 (2011).   
112. See Johnson, supra note 20, at 194. 
113. Counterparty credit risk describes the risk that a counterparty may default or fail to satisfy 
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the underlying asset and the CDS counterparty default, the protection 
buyer will sustain losses under both contractual arrangements. The risk 
that a protection buyer may face compounding credit and counterparty 
defaults necessitates careful evaluation of the issuer and CDS 
counterparties’ credit worthiness. 
An illustration may be useful. Assume for example, that a protection 
buyer owns a $10 million sovereign bond issued by The Republic of 
Greece. Concerned that Greece may default on its debt obligations, the 
protection buyer enters into a CDS agreement with a protection seller. 
The protection buyer pays the protection seller ten percent of the 
notional value of the bond or $100,000. In exchange for payment of this 
premium, the protection seller agrees to purchase the bond at face value 
if Greece defaults on its debt principal or interest payment obligations. 
Investment banking engineers created credit derivatives to diversify 
the universe of hedging products. Theoretically, CDOs diversify market 
participants’ risk exposure protecting any one firm from severe losses if 
a debt issuer or borrower defaults on a debt obligation; similarly, CDSs 
provide a guarantee for the protection buyer, ensuring against losses 
related to a decline in the value of a bond or loan.114 For banking 
institutions subject to regulatory capital requirements, the appearance of 
reduced exposure to risk permits the bank to reduce the amount of 
capital that the bank must retain on reserve to satisfy federal 
regulations.115 The appearance of reduced risk exposure permits the bank 
to issue additional loans, further leverage its assets, or enter into other 
arrangements that create risk exposure for the bank.116 Advocates of 
credit derivatives posit that these instruments enhance credit markets and 
expand commercial and consumer access to credit. 
As the theory of the firm suggests, internalizing and outsourcing 
trading creates predictable costs.117 Similar to transactions in the 
                                                     
principal and interest obligations. See generally Johnson, supra note 50, at 65; Miguel A. Segoviano 
& Manmohan Singh, Counterparty Risk in the Over-The-Counter Derivatives Market 5–8 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 08/258, 2008), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08258.pdf. A broader description of credit risk 
might include concentration risk, or the risk that arises when individual or group exposure creates 
the potential for losses and country risk, or the risk that a country may default on sovereign debt 
obligations. See generally Johnson, supra note 50, at 65. 
114. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 100, at 125. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. For a discussion of the costs associated with sophisticated trading technology, see Kenneth 
A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
669, 686–87 (2010). Scholars generally acknowledge that OTC derivatives trading is more 
expensive than trading less complicated financial products. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Derivatives, 
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equities, swaps, options, futures, and forwards markets, early entrants in 
the OTC derivatives markets faced the decision to vertically integrate 
trading, outsource trading, or organize a specialized firm to execute, 
clear, and settle transactions.118 In the absence of a formal institution 
designed to order trading in the OTC derivatives market, market 
participants adopted each of these methods. The implementation of these 
trading methods created three precipitating conditions that led to 
                                                     
Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later, 1998 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1039, 1098 (1998); Daniel G. Schmedlen, Jr., Broker-Dealer Sales Practice in Derivatives 
Transactions: A Survey and Evaluation of Suitability Requirements, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1441, 
1454 (1995).  
118. As Part I.C. explained, trading in financial markets may be organized internally (two firms 
engage in securities or commodities transactions directly) or through the use of an external 
intermediary (a firm uses a broker to execute securities or commodities trades). See supra Part I.C. 
Highly evolved securities and commodities markets rely on either a specialized firm, an exchange or 
a clearinghouse, to organize anonymous transactions among a wide array of market participants. See 
supra Part I.D.  
While futures and option contracts were initially traded in a bilateral market, these derivatives 
arrangements currently trade on highly complex, formally organized exchanges. See, e.g., ROBERT 
WHALEY, DERIVATIVES: MARKETS, VALUATIONS, AND RISK MANAGEMENT 35 (2006) (noting that 
the concept of options contracts dates back to 1750 B.C. and outlining the development of formal 
futures and options exchanges more than two centuries later). The development of trading in the 
OTC credit derivatives market has followed a similar course.  
Prior to the late 1990s, the dominant lending model involved a single-borrower, single-lender 
model, in which a bank originated a loan to a designated borrower and the bank retained risk 
exposure related to the loan until the principal and interest obligations on the loan were satisfied. 
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 100, at 77. In the late 1990s, banks began to depart from this 
originate-and-hold approach. Id. Two catalysts inspired the departure from this approach. First, a 
model involving a group of banks agreeing to lend collectively to a single borrower—syndicated 
lending arrangements—gained increasing popularity. DOUGLAS J. LUCAS, LAURIE S. GOODMAN & 
FRANK J. FABOZZI, COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS: STRUCTURES AND ANALYSIS 249–50 
(2006). 
Second, in 1997, a team of bankers at JP Morgan led by Managing Director Blythe Masters 
developed the Broad Index Secured Trust Offering (BISTRO), radically altering banks’ ability to 
mitigate risks related to debt exposure. BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE 
HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, 78–81 (2010). BISTRO, the earliest form 
of a credit derivative, enabled banks to compile a portfolio of debt obligations and purchase credit 
protection for the designated portfolio. Id. In other words, BISTRO combined a) pooling and 
securitizing debt assets, and b) overlaying an insurance-like hedge around the arrangement that 
protects the bank against default risk. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 100, at 124–26. In exchange 
for payment of a premium, a counterparty agrees to pay the face value of underlying assets. Id. at 
79–81. The BISTRO transactions protected creditors from the risk of loss associated with the 
potential default by the corporate issuer on the debt obligations transferred to the SPV; this 
approach reduced the appearance of banks’ risk exposure and consequently, banks’ need to maintain 
capital reserves. Id. at 125.  
Bankers described the contracts that provide insurance-like protection against default risk on the 
SPV debt obligations as CDS. While banks initially traded CDSs bilaterally, efforts to mitigate 
costs, enhance operational efficiency, and standardize clearing and settlement of these transactions 
prompted banks to organize formal clearinghouses to execute them. WHALEY, supra, at 21–35. 
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devastating losses in OTC derivatives markets during the recent 
financial crisis. 
First, during the period leading to the financial crisis, OTC derivatives 
markets grew exponentially.119 In the absence of a formal, publicly-
ordered market, the expansive growth of OTC derivatives agreements 
occurred in an opaque, bilateral, shadow market. Without a designated 
repository, there was limited market data regarding OTC derivatives 
transactions. Market participants were often unaware of the magnitude 
of their counterparties’ risk exposure related to OTC derivatives 
contracts. 
Second, operational risks plagued these informal, private markets.120 
Market participants employed informal contract execution and trading 
procedures, creating backlogs and disputes regarding contractual 
obligations.121 While securities and commodities exchanges or 
clearinghouses manage these transactional details for regulated financial 
products, counterparties trading OTC derivatives managed these 
responsibilities internally or outsourced trading.122 
Unlike the fungible stocks and bonds that trade on regulated securities 
and commodities exchanges, OTC derivatives contracts are often highly 
customized agreements; their novelty makes it difficult to execute these 
transactions on traditional securities and commodities exchange 
platforms.123 As a result, early market entrants implemented internal 
                                                     
119. The size of the CDS market grew from a negligible volume of private contracts at the 
market’s inception in the 1980s to a market with a notional value of over $596 trillion just before 
the height of the recent financial crisis in the fall of 2008. See infra note 127.  
120. Operational risk refers to the “risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events.” Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the 
Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 134 (2009). For a detailed discussion of the operational risks that 
challenged the OTC derivatives markets in the period prior to the recent financial crisis, see 
Johnson, supra note 20, at 205.   
121. WHALEY, supra note 118, at 35 (noting that early derivatives “markets lacked depth and 
liquidity, which meant that early unwinding of a contract involved negotiating with your 
counterparty, frequently at unfavorable terms . . . [i]n addition, contract defaults were 
commonplace, undermining the integrity of the market”). Market participants may have relied on a 
mere term sheet, an email exchange, or a fax. The parties may have failed to execute a formal 
contract or segregate the collateral supporting the agreement. Id. Either or both parties may 
subsequently trade their interests in the contract in an informal secondary market. Id. Consequently, 
unwinding multiple informal agreements engendered operational risks in OTC derivatives markets. 
122. Johnson, supra note 20, at 213 (citing COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, CREDIT RISK TRANSFER 6 (2003), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs20.pdf). 
See generally Sharma, supra note 111. 
123. OTC derivatives contracts are often specifically tailored to address specific risk concerns. 
Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1287, 1303–04 (2010); D’Souza, Ellis & Fairchild, supra note 82, at 504.   
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trading processes or outsourced trading to a group of large investment 
banks acting as OTC derivatives dealers.124 
Thus, market participants absorbed the costs of information gathering, 
obtaining intellectual property licenses for trading software, and 
documenting, monitoring, clearing, and settling transactions.125 Risk 
management failures, such as errors in trade documentation, evaluation 
of counterparties’ creditworthiness, or the valuation of collateral, 
exposed market participants to potentially perilous losses. These 
preclusive trading costs restricted the number of market participants 
eligible to engage in OTC derivatives transactions. As a result, the OTC 
derivatives market became highly concentrated.126 The burgeoning 
volume of transactions, coupled with the limited number of financial 
institutions engaging in the OTC derivatives market, transformed 
common default, counterparty, and operational risks into systemic 
risks.127 
The absence of an effective governing authority in the OTC market 
prior to the crisis128 created a third contributing factor. While trade 
                                                     
124. The institutional development phase of privatization began with the creation of the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) in the mid-1980s. Through ISDA, swaps 
and derivatives dealers and their lawyers developed the foundational documents for swap 
transactions. Houman B. Shadab, Guilty By Association? Regulating Credit Default Swaps, 4 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 407, 422–24 (2010). Lawyers played a critical role in drafting 
standard swap documentation, which reduced transaction costs associated with contract negotiation 
and facilitated dispute resolution by introducing form agreements. See About ISDA, INT’L SWAPS & 
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www2.isda.org/about-isda (last visited Jan. 25, 2013); CME GROUP, 
http://www.cmegroup.com/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2013); INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, 
https://www.theice.com/homepage.jhtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
125. Bamberger, supra note 117, at 685–86. 
126. Johnson, supra note 20, at 213 (citing COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, CREDIT RISK TRANSFER 6 (2003), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs20.pdf). 
127. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CREDIT RISK TRANSFER 
6 (2003), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs20.pdf. From the end of 1998 through the end of 
2005, the total size of the OTC derivatives market increased at an annual rate of approximately 
twenty percent. COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR OTC DERIVATIVES 8–10 
(2007). By the end of June 2006, the total size of the OTC derivatives market, as measured by total 
notional amount of contracts outstanding, was almost $370 trillion. Id. The notional amounts of 
OTC contracts continued to increase through 2006, reaching $415 trillion by December. 
MONETARY AND ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET 
ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2006, at 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0705.pdf. By the end of 2007, the notional amounts of all categories 
of OTC contracts reached $596 trillion, an increase of approximately forty-four percent from the 
previous year. MONETARY AND ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES 
MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2007, at 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0805.pdf. 
128. Johnson, supra note 20, at 213. 
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organizations attempted to ameliorate risks, the market lacked broader 
oversight. The development of OTC derivatives and the promise of 
transaction fees generated from trading structured derivative products 
inspired banks and trade organizations affiliated with the derivatives 
market to improve bilateral trading practices and adopt uniform 
settlement procedures. For example, the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA)129 introduced certain governance 
mechanisms, including collateral policies, standardized contracts, and 
common settlement terms.130 These market improvements reduced 
transaction costs.131 No domestic or international regulator, however, 
directly monitored the risk exposure teeming in the OTC derivatives 
market.132 
In 2007, the debt obligations underlying a large volume of OTC 
derivatives contracts began to decline in value; the rapid change in the 
value of the debt obligations pooled in CDO arrangements revealed the 
weaknesses of internal and contractual governance mechanisms. In 
September of 2008, American International Group, Inc. (AIG) nearly 
collapsed as staggering losses arising from their CDS portfolio thrust the 
firm toward insolvency.133 AIG’s risk management processes, 
executives, and board failed to properly assess the firm’s exposure in the 
CDS market.134 AIG’s near collapse triggered a cascade of losses among 
                                                     
129. Id. at 229–30 (“ISDA currently develops essential trading policies and best practice 
standards and resolves disputes among its members. ISDA also advises market participants on 
clearing and settlement procedures and settlement auctions.”). 
130. Bamberger, supra note 117, at 674–75; Shadab, supra note 124, at 422–24. 
131. WHALEY, supra note 118, at 35 (describing the origins of ISDA in the early 1980s and its 
role in developing standardized documents for OTC derivatives transactions and implementing 
basic settlement procedures for bilateral trades).  
132. Johnson, supra note 20, at 213. 
133. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm (announcing the Federal Reserve’s 
decision to bailout AIG and explaining that AIG’s failure would damage markets). Trading partners 
assumed that contractual covenants served as an effective governance mechanism in OTC 
derivatives transactions because the agreements are exempted from the automatic stay in bankruptcy 
proceeding. Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
123, 130 (2010); Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special 
Treatment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 61, 67 (2009) (explaining the safe harbor in the Bankruptcy Code 
for derivatives). 
134. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Financial Markets and Networks—Implications for Financial 
Market Regulation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 613, 618–20 (2009); Johnson, supra note 20, at 215–16; 
Carrick Mollenkamp, Serena Ng, Liam Pleven, & Randall Smith, Behind AIG’s Fall, Risk Models 
Failed to Pass Real-World Test, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2008, at A1; Gretchen Morgenson, A.I.G., 
Where Taxpayers’ Dollars Go to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at BU1; Serena Ng, AIG, Goldman 
Unwind Soured Trades, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2010, at C1. 
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the intimately interconnected web of sophisticated financial institutions 
in the OTC derivatives market. 
The threat of losses flowed across the financial services industry, 
creating systemic risk concerns and producing detrimental spillover 
effects.135 The federal government acted to prevent a run on large 
financial institutions and to bail out OTC derivatives market 
participants.136 The mounting negative externalities triggered by losses 
in the OTC derivatives market demonstrated the insufficiency of market-
based governance solutions and prompted Congress to act. 
B.  Dodd-Frank Introduces Mandatory Clearing 
In an effort to mitigate the systemic risk concerns created in the OTC 
derivatives market, Congress enacted Title VII of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.137 Title VII of the Act introduces a formal governance structure, an 
institutional safeguard designed to enhance transparency, improve 
operational efficiency, and increase risk oversight in the OTC 
derivatives markets.138 Section 725 of the Act removes the shroud that 
previously veiled OTC derivatives markets.139 Under this Section, 
traders must register OTC derivatives transactions with designated 
derivatives clearing organizations.140 The registration requirements 
encourage greater risk oversight among individual firms and enable 
federal agencies to better assess aggregate risk across the market.141 
In addition to the registration obligations, Section 726 of the Act 
requires market participants to clear eligible OTC derivatives 
transactions through authorized clearinghouses.142 The clearing 
                                                     
135. Spillover effects are externalities that impact third parties who are not engaged in a 
particular activity. See Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J. Lubben, A Comparative Study of 
Bankruptcy as Bailout, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 79, 87 (2011) (describing the spill-over 
effects that arise from a bankruptcy). Spillover effects arise when market participants fail to 
internalize the negative externalities that their activities create. See also Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1349, 1402 (2011) (“Analogizing excessive risk-taking to the tragedy of the commons suggests that 
regulatory policy should correct for risk-spillovers in financial markets by requiring firms to take 
into account the impact of their behavior on systemic stability.”); Johnson, supra note 20, at 213.   
136. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered 
sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 41 U.S.C.). 
137. Id. §§ 701–74 (codified in scattered sections of 7 and 15 U.S.C.). 
138. Id. § 726(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8323 (Supp. 2011)). 
139. Id. § 725 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (Supp. 2011)). 
140. Id. § 725(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1). 
141. Id. § 725 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1). 
142. Id. § 726 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8323). 
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requirement integrates an institutional-based regulatory solution that 
encompasses elements of internal risk management and private contract 
law. First, firms must establish internal governance systems to monitor 
their employees’ compliance with section 726.143 Next, any market 
participant seeking to enter into or trade eligible OTC derivatives 
contracts must become a member of an authorized clearinghouse or 
contract with a member of a clearinghouse.144 
Similar to exchanges, clearinghouses generate valuable positive 
externalities that enhance net social welfare. Clearinghouses mitigate the 
two types of credit risk that characterized bilateral markets—issuer 
default risk and counterparty credit risk. A clearinghouse acts as a 
central counterparty (CCP), interposing itself between the buyers and 
sellers of OTC derivatives transactions executed on its platform.145 
Unlike the bespoke OTC derivatives trading practices prior to the 
adoption of Title VII, trading through the clearinghouse introduces a 
central hub in the market that matches transactions between buyers and 
sellers.146 When a member expresses desire to enter into an OTC 
derivatives contract as a buyer, the clearinghouse identifies a 
counterparty who is interested in entering into the contract as a seller.147 
The clearinghouse becomes a buyer to every seller and a seller to every 
buyer. Migrating the trades within the industry onto a clearinghouse 
platform thus mitigates risk exposure by increasing the transparency in 
the industry and maximizing allocational efficiency. Clearinghouse 
members can reduce the amount of collateral that they post because their 
trades will be settled in a manner that considers members’ various 
accounts, transactions across asset classes, and agreements with various 
counterparties.148 
Figure 1 below illustrates the bespoke OTC derivatives market 
                                                     
143. Id. § 731 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s). 
144. Id. § 733 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7b-3). 
145. Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting, Asymmetric 
Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks Through a Central Counterparty 1, 16 (Univ. of 
Houston Dep’t of Fin., Working Paper, 2009), available at 
http://www.cba.uh.edu/spirrong/clearing_organization.pdf. 
146. WHALEY, supra note 118, at 21. 
147. Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why 
Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 
65 (2011).  
148. Viral V. Acharya, Or Shachar & Marti Subrahmanyam, Regulating OTC Derivatives, in 
REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL 
FINANCE 367, 399 (Viral V. Acharya, Thomas F. Cooley, Matthew P. Richardson, and Ingo Walter 
eds., 2011). 
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characterized by bilateral trading relationships prior to the recent 
financial crisis.149 Figure 2 depicts the hub-and-spoke market that arises 
when a clearinghouse serves as a CCP.150 
 
FIGURE 1 – OTC derivatives counterparty relationships without a CCP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 – Clearing trades through a Central Counterparty 
 
 
Beyond the increased transparency and organizational benefits that 
centralized clearing introduces, clearinghouses also offer a structural 
                                                     
149. DARRELL DUFFIE, ADA LI & THEO LUBKE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORTS, 
POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 5 (2010). 
150. Id. at 6. 
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mechanism that mitigates counterparty credit risk. By standing between 
the buyer and the seller in each OTC derivatives transaction and 
guaranteeing each transaction executed on its platform, the 
clearinghouse mitigates market participants’ exposure to default and 
counterparty credit risk.151 Clearinghouses guarantee that each member 
will “make good” on its obligations related to contracts executed on the 
clearinghouse platform.152 If a buyer defaults, the seller may hold the 
clearinghouse liable for the legal consequences of the buyer’s default. 
By guaranteeing the transactions executed on its platform, 
clearinghouses stand behind both sides of a trading transaction, reducing 
market participants’ exposure to counterparty credit risk. 
Concentrating credit risk exposure within a handful of clearing 
businesses and guaranteeing satisfaction of cleared transactions may, 
however, increase systemic risk. As a consequence of their role 
centralizing risk exposure, clearinghouses face the potential that each 
member or several members may default on their obligations related to 
OTC derivatives transactions. The default of a clearing member with a 
significant volume of active OTC derivatives trades or a series of 
defaults among a group of clearing members may threaten the solvency 
of the clearinghouse. 
To mitigate its risk exposure, a clearinghouse adopts several risk 
management policies. First, clearinghouses intentionally aim to be net 
zero, meaning the clearinghouse enters into transactions only when an 
identified buyer and a seller seek to contract on the same material 
terms.153 To limit their exposure to market risk, clearinghouses simply 
match trade requests with the trade requests of members who are 
interested in taking an opposite trading position.154 This approach limits 
clearinghouses’ exposure to market risk or changes in the value of 
derivatives contracts; clearinghouses remain vulnerable, however, to 
counterparty risk. 
Second, clearinghouses impose minimum capital contribution 
requirements and position limits on clearing members.155 Clearinghouses 
typically deposit capital contributions into a collective reserve fund that 
the clearinghouse draws upon if a member defaults on its obligations.156 
Moreover, membership criteria and trade eligibility standards ensure that 
                                                     
151. Kress, supra note 147, at 65. 
152. Id.   
153. WHALEY, supra note 118, at 22. 
154. Clearinghouses typically do not warehouse contracts or engage in market making activities. 
155. WHALEY, supra note 118, at 21 n.24. 
156. DUFFIE, LI & LUBKE, supra note 149, at 7. 
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market participants meet threshold requirements for engaging in OTC 
derivatives transactions. 
Third, clearinghouses impose margin and collateral requirements to 
ensure that members maintain sufficient resources in their segregated 
trading accounts to satisfy their trading obligations under outstanding 
OTC derivatives contracts.157 Together, the capital requirements, 
position limits, and margin and collateral obligations provide several 
layers of risk management protection. 
Examining an application of clearinghouse risk management practices 
offers a useful illustration. If a member defaults on its trading 
obligations, a clearinghouse will first apply the value of the defaulting 
member’s margin account to its contractual obligations under its 
outstanding trades. If the funds in the member’s margin account are 
insufficient to satisfy trading obligations, the clearinghouse draws upon 
resources from the reserve fund to settle the defaulting member’s trading 
obligations. 
In addition to these risk management benefits, clearinghouses also 
reduce operational risk and promote market integrity and stability. 
Acting as CCPs, clearinghouses introduce formal trade documentation, 
execution, and settlement processes.158 By introducing standardized 
documentation and procedures, clearinghouses reduce transaction costs 
and increase certainty regarding the settlement and enforceability of 
OTC derivatives contracts. These improvements enhance the stability of 
OTC derivatives markets. 
CCPs also facilitate loss mutualization, credit risk homogenization, 
and multi-lateral netting.159 These standards reduce information 
                                                     
157. See, e.g., CME GROUP, INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2011); 
INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2011); About Eurex Clearing, 
EUREX CLEARING AG, http://www.eurexclearing.com/clearing-en/about-us/company-profile/ (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2013); LCH.Clearnet, LCH.CLEARNET GROUP, LTD., http://www.lchclearnet.com/ 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2013). 
158. Clearinghouses ensure that members segregate collateral and enforce other material terms in 
OTC derivatives transactions. See, e.g., CME GROUP, INC., supra note 157, at 5; 
INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, INC., supra note 157, at 4; EUREX CLEARING AG, supra note 157; 
LCH.CLEARNET GROUP, LTD., supra note 157. 
159. Risk of loss is mutualized by spreading the potential effect risk among clearing members. 
Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk In the United States Financial System, 33 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 671, 695 (2010). Credit homogenization refers to the standardization of credit risk. Bob 
Hills, David Rule, Sarah Parkinson & Chris Young, Central Counterparty Clearing Houses and 
Financial Stability, FIN. STABILITY REV., June 1999, at 122, 129–30. Because the CCP is the 
underlying counterparty to each transaction executed on its platform, members do not face the 
varying credit qualities of counterparties. Id. Rather, members are uniformly exposed to the risk of 
the CCP’s creditworthiness. Id. Credit risk homogenization reduces the costs associated with 
members’ due diligence and monitoring activities. Id. Multilateral netting enables clearinghouse 
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asymmetries and enhance price discovery, promoting greater market 
efficiency and integrity.160 Each of these risk management policies 
mitigates systemic risk concerns, or concerns that a significant 
clearinghouse member or group of members will default on their 
contractual obligations, initiating a chain reaction of losses across OTC 
derivatives markets. 
Economic organization theory describes clearinghouses as specialized 
firms. These institutions, forged by the collaborative efforts of market 
participants who are members of the clearinghouse, provide market 
participants with an alternative trade execution approach. This approach 
avoids the agency costs that arise when firms vertically integrate trading 
and the transaction costs that may arise if firms rely on bilateral 
transactions. Through its governance role, clearinghouses reduce the 
likelihood that hold-up problems will arise. 
Relying on clearinghouses to govern OTC market activities, however, 
creates a new set of concerns. Careful evaluation reveals that pervasive 
conflicts of interest and members’ self-interested commercial incentives 
weaken clearinghouse governance, threatening clearinghouses’ effective 
internal risk management policies and creating systemic risk concerns. 
As Part I.B. explained, in recent years, several of the largest securities 
and commodities exchanges and clearinghouses demutualized, 
converting from cooperative clubs to private corporations.161 These 
                                                     
members to net their gains and losses across different classes of underlying assets. DUFFIE, LI & 
LUBKE, supra note 149, at 14 (“Whenever different types of derivatives are cleared with the same 
CCP, rather than at distinct CCPs, counterparty exposures are further reduced, on average, through 
the netting of positive position values in some derivative types against negative position values in 
others. Market participants may therefore prefer a single CCP, at least within a particular asset class, 
in order to have more efficient risk reduction and collateral allocation.”). 
160. See ROBERT W. KOLB & JAMES A. OVERDAHL, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: PRICING AND 
RISK MANAGEMENT 16, 20 (2010) (describing price discovery as a process in which market 
transactions reflect both the economic impact of new information and market participants’ 
expectations of asset prices); see also Julia Lees Allen, Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic 
Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1087 (2012); Kress, supra 
note 147, at 65–69; Markham & Harty, supra note 90, at 882.  
161. Currently, the market reflects a mix of organizational approaches. Some clearinghouses 
remain closely-held businesses. See, e.g., LCH.CLEARNET GROUP, LTD., supra note 157 
(LCH.Clearnet is an independent company which “is owned 77.5% by its clients and 22.5% by [the] 
exchanges”). Others have elected to incorporate and distribute their equity shares in public 
offerings. See e.g., CME GROUP, INC., supra note 157, at 5 (CME Group is the parent company of 
CME Clearing Europe Ltd.); INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, INC., supra note 157, at 4 (relating 
that the customers of ICE, the parent company of ICE Clear Europe Ltd., include “corporations, 
manufacturers, utilities, commodity producers and refiners, professional traders, financial 
institutions, institutional and individual investors and governmental bodies”). In a few instances, 
exchanges have created subsidiaries to offer clearing services. EUREX CLEARING AG, supra note 
157 (Eurex is a wholly owned subsidiary of Eurex Frankfurt AG and a public company); CME 
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exchanges and clearinghouses registered their equity securities with the 
SEC, distributed the securities in initial public offerings, and listed the 
securities on national exchanges. Converting to public corporations 
increased exchange and clearinghouse shareholders’ liquidity, enabling 
shareholders to trade their ownership interests with greater ease. 
Beyond these organizational changes, several exchanges and 
clearinghouses merged with other national, regional, or foreign 
exchanges, forming international conglomerates with trading venues in 
multiple countries around the world. The implications of these 
organizational changes are significant. Reorganizing the ownership 
structure of exchanges and clearinghouses creates noteworthy conflicts 
of interest. 
A tension emerges between clearinghouses’ public service role and 
their private ownership structure. While clearinghouses and exchanges 
are private businesses, these institutions provide a critical, public, 
infrastructure resource within financial markets. The self-regulatory 
approach adopted in financial markets presumes that clearinghouses and 
exchanges will provide a public service and engage in market oversight. 
The owners of exchanges and clearinghouses may, however, prioritize 
profit-maximizing strategies that de-emphasize or conflict with 
regulatory goals. The conflict between regulators’ expectations and 
exchange and clearinghouse owners’ priorities leads to questions 
regarding the merits of employing self-regulation. In the absence of 
effective internal governance mechanisms, clearinghouse members may 
prioritize their individual interests ahead of the integrity of 
clearinghouses. 
Notwithstanding an impassioned debate among regulators, scholars, 
and market participants regarding the significance of these conflicts and 
the institutional constraints that they create, Congress elected to impose 
a self-regulatory framework on OTC derivatives markets and endow 
clearinghouses with a license to serve as regulators in these markets. 
Therefore, clearinghouses that are owned and controlled by market 
participants or parent companies whose equity shares are publicly-
traded, will serve as the primary market regulators in OTC derivatives 
                                                     
GROUP, INC., supra note 157, at 100; INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, INC., supra note 157, at 11; 
LCH.CLEARNET GROUP, LTD., ANNUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS 2011, at 67 (2012). For a detailed 
treatment of the risk management concerns arising from clearinghouse governance policies, see 
Sean Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives 
Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153, 1165 (2012); Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of 
Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 391–94 (2012); RENA S. MILLER, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN DERIVATIVES CLEARING 5–6 (2011), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1832&context=key_workplace. 
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markets. These private businesses retain the discretion to decide 
significant regulatory policies. Clearinghouses determine market 
participants’ eligibility for membership, the criteria for eligible OTC 
derivatives transactions, and quintessential risk management policies, 
such as capital, margin, and collateral requirements.162 
As Part I.B indicated, traditionally state law mandates rudimentary 
internal governance designs for corporations and other business 
organizations.163 Congress will, however, intervene where state law or 
contractual mechanisms fail to establish an adequate balance between 
the authority granted to managers and their accountability for the 
externalities that businesses engender.164 In response to criticism 
regarding Title VII’s reliance on self-regulation, clearinghouse 
members’ conflicts of interest, and concerns that weak clearinghouse 
risk management policies may cause risk management and systemic risk 
failures, Congress authorized the SEC and CFTC to adopt clearinghouse 
governance policies. These federal regulatory agencies have proposed 
rules focusing on two specific elements of clearinghouse governance: 
clearinghouse membership and clearing eligibility policies. 
1.  Anti-competitive Incentives Will Limit Access to Clearinghouse 
Membership 
Clearinghouses generally permit only members to execute 
transactions on a clearinghouse platform. Clearinghouse members may 
trade for their own accounts or execute transactions on behalf of their 
clients as dealers. If a nonmember desires to execute transactions on the 
clearinghouse platform, the trader must identify a member who is 
willing to serve as a dealer and execute the transaction on behalf of the 
nonmember.165 
The large financial institutions that execute significant volumes of 
OTC derivatives transactions—the large dealers—earn sizeable fees for 
                                                     
162. CME GROUP, INC., supra note 157, at 6; EUREX CLEARING AG, ANNUAL FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2011, AND MANAGEMENT REPORT 8–16 
(2012); INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, INC., supra note 157, at 9–10; LCH.CLEARNET GROUP, 
LTD., ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 161, at 54–57. 
163. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011). 
164. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.); see also Johnson, supra note 50, at 93–100 
(discussing federal corporate governance reforms incorporated in the Dodd-Frank Act).  
165. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND COUNTERPARTY RISK 52 
(2009), available at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/creditdefaultswapsandcounterpartyrisk2009en.pdf. 
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executing transactions on behalf of smaller dealers.166 By obtaining a 
majority of the ownership interests in clearinghouses, large dealers may 
exercise sufficient voting authority to control the election of directors to 
clearinghouse boards and the appointment of directors to board 
committees. Controlling the board and board committees enables large 
dealers to establish critical operational policies, such as membership 
eligibility standards. 
Restricting access to clearinghouse membership creates a market 
opportunity for the dealers who successfully obtain membership. 
Adopting selective membership eligibility criteria protects the fees that 
large dealers earn for brokering transactions on behalf of excluded OTC 
derivatives dealers.167 If clearinghouses adopt restrictive policies 
regarding membership eligibility, then small dealers, or dealers who 
execute fewer transactions or contracts involving smaller monetary 
amounts, may be precluded from becoming clearinghouse members. 
Dealers precluded from becoming clearinghouse members must contract 
with clearinghouse members to execute OTC derivatives transactions 
following the adoption of Title VII’s clearing mandate. 
Beyond their rent-seeking motivations, large dealers may offer 
legitimate commercial justifications for adopting exclusive membership 
eligibility criteria. For example, large dealers complain that small 
dealers seeking clearinghouse membership will be unable to satisfy 
minimum capital contribution, margin and collateral requirements. 
Recall that clearinghouses agree to guarantee the transactions executed 
on their platforms.168 Small dealers generally have less capital than large 
dealers. Thus, in order for small dealers to gain access to membership, 
clearinghouses must adopt lower capital requirements than they would 
adopt if only large dealers participated as members. Large dealers, 
therefore, argue that admitting small dealers creates unnecessary credit 
and counterparty risks.169 
                                                     
166. Christine Harper, Matthew Leising & Shannon Harrington, Wall Street Stealth Lobby 
Defends $35 Billion Derivatives Haul, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 30, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agFM_w6e2i00. 
167. See Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The Case of 
Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 145 (1995) (describing the disadvantages of relying on 
an SRO to serve as a regulator when members with rent-seeking incentives control the SRO and 
noting that, in these instances, controlling members’ interests may diverge from those of the 
membership as a whole). 
168. See supra Part II.A. 
169. See Michael Greenberger, Diversifying Clearinghouse Ownership in Order to Safeguard 
Free and Open Access to the Derivatives Clearing Market, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 5–8 
(forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2176&context=fac_pubs. 
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Even if admitting smaller dealers creates credit risk, commentators 
disagree with claims that small dealers’ defaults will lead to 
clearinghouse insolvencies. Additionally, two negative implications 
follow from restrictive membership policies. First, restrictive 
membership criteria impedes Title VII’s goals to integrate as many 
market participants and transactions as possible into a formal clearing 
process. Second, limiting small dealers’ direct access to clearinghouse 
platforms encourages small dealers and large dealers to continue to 
strike bilateral arrangements outside of the purview of the clearinghouse 
and regulators. With small dealers excluded from clearinghouse 
platforms, a significant volume of transactions will continue to occur in 
private, bilateral markets, undermining Title VII’s transparency goals 
and perpetuating trading in an opaque market. 
2.  Anti-competitive Incentives Will Limit Clearing Eligibility 
Clearinghouse boards also have the authority to decide clearing 
eligibility policies.170 Similar to the economic incentives to restrict 
clearinghouse membership, large dealers have commercial incentives to 
limit the OTC derivative products that are eligible for settlement on 
clearinghouse platforms. Directors, who are likely to be appointed by the 
large dealers who control economic and voting interests in the 
clearinghouse, may face conflicts of interest when evaluating the 
policies that determine the clearing eligibility of OTC transactions. 
Well before the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act, clearinghouses 
initiated OTC derivatives clearing services.171 Initially, however, 
because clearing customized OTC derivatives trades involved greater 
credit and operational risk, clearing services were limited.172 Large 
dealers responded to the absence of a resource for clearing customized 
transactions by providing informal clearing services. The dealers earned 
                                                     
170. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 725, 124 Stat. 1376, 1685 (2010) (codified at 7 
U.S.C. § 7a-1 (Supp. 2011)); Financial Resources Requirements for Derivatives Clearing 
Organizations, 75 Fed. Reg. 63113, 63113 (proposed Oct. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
39, 140). 
171. CME GROUP, INC., supra note 157, at 5; INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, INC., supra note 
157, at 5. 
172. CME GROUP, INC., supra note 157, at 5; INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, INC., supra note 
157, at 5. Certain OTC derivatives agreements are standard contracts that reference highly-liquid, 
fungible assets, such as a ten-year IBM bond or a fifteen-year General Motors bond. The frequency 
of trading of the underlying asset facilitates price discovery for standard OTC derivatives contracts. 
CME GROUP, INC., supra note 157, at 5–6; INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, INC., supra note 157, at 
3–4. 
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significant fees for clearing customized transactions.173 Notwithstanding 
clearinghouses’ interest in clearing the greatest volume of transactions, 
large dealers may pressure the directors they appoint to promote more 
restrictive clearing policies. The restrictive clearing policies will ensure 
that some volume of OTC derivatives transactions continue to clear in 
informal, opaque markets. The trades that clear in informal markets will 
continue to generate fees for large dealers.174 Similar to preclusive 
membership eligibility criteria, restrictive clearing eligibility policies 
may undermine Title VII’s clearing mandate.175 
3.  Weak Clearinghouse Governance Creates Moral Hazard, Risk 
Management, and Systemic Risk Concerns 
The previous section considered large dealers’ commercial incentives 
to artificially restrict membership access and clearing eligibility to 
enhance the fees that they earn for their role as dealers. Large financial 
institutions also have individual incentives to manipulate clearinghouse 
risk management policies. Risk management concerns arise when 
directors, sponsored by large dealers, do not act in the best interest of the 
clearinghouse; rather, directors resolve policy questions based on what 
they perceive to be in the best interest of the large dealers who 
nominated them to the board. Allowing large dealers to control 
clearinghouses’ internal decision-making processes may weaken critical 
risk management policies, engender moral hazard concerns, and create 
systemic risks.  
Clearinghouses’ risk management tools include operational strategies, 
position limits, collateral and margin requirements, and obligations for 
members to contribute to reserve funds. As Viral V. Acharya, Or 
Shachar and Marti Subrahmanyam, explain, “[t]o minimize . . . risk, a 
CCP relies on a range of controls and methods, including stringent 
membership access, a robust margining regime, clear default 
management procedures, and significant financial resources to back its 
                                                     
173. See Harper, Leising & Harrington, supra note 166; see also Ownership Limitations and 
Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap 
Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges With Respect to Security-Based Swaps 
Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882, 65,8845 (proposed Oct. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 242). 
174. See, e.g., DUFFIE, LI & LUBKE, supra note 149, at 32.  
175. Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1376 (“To promote the financial stability of the United States 
by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to 
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices, and for other purposes.”). 
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performance.”176 Recall that a clearinghouse typically avoids risk 
exposure (as well as the potential for any gains and losses) by agreeing 
to clear contracts for members only if the clearinghouse can identify 
other members willing to take the opposite position on the same 
contracts. A clearinghouse’s election to enter into offsetting positions 
offers an example of an operational strategy that mitigates risk exposure. 
Despite risk management efforts, however, clearinghouses continue to 
face significant risk exposure. In the above example, the clearinghouse 
mitigates market risk exposure (the potential for a contact to increase or 
decrease in value) but remains exposed to counterparty credit risk (the 
risk that any of the parties who clear contracts on the clearinghouse 
platform may default).177 If a clearinghouse member with a large volume 
of contracts or a series of members whose transactions constitute a 
significant volume of contracts should default, the clearinghouse may 
face insolvency or bankruptcy. 
Noteworthy concerns emerge when one couples (a) concerns 
regarding clearinghouse directors’ objectivity with (b) the consolidation 
of trading within a single clearinghouse or across a small number of 
clearinghouses.178 By migrating OTC derivatives contracts onto its 
platform, each clearinghouse consolidates the risks in OTC derivatives 
markets. The concentration of risk within clearinghouses and among 
participants in the clearing industry requires careful evaluation and 
monitoring. These realities heighten the significance of the 
clearinghouse as a market risk regulator.179 
                                                     
176. Acharya, Shachar & Subrahmanyam, supra note 148, at 399.  
177. Id. 
178. Increasing the number of clearinghouses in the OTC derivatives market does not necessarily 
alleviate concerns; clearing a significant volume of diverse products on the platforms of large 
number of clearinghouses that lack interoperability may lead to fragmentation, insufficient 
information sharing, and excessive posting of collateral. 
179. Only a small number of clearinghouses have received authorization to act as derivatives 
clearing organizations. Order Extending Temporary Exemptions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
63388, 99 SEC Docket 3480 (Nov. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/exorders/2010/34-63388.pdf (granting Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc. 
an exemption to clear CDS transactions); Order Extending Temporary Exemptions, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-63389, 99 SEC Docket 3482 (Nov. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/exorders/2010/34-63389.pdf (granting ICE Clear Europe, Ltd. an 
exemption to clear CDS transactions); Order Extending Temporary Exemptions, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-63387, 99 SEC Docket 3457 (Nov. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/exorders/2010/34-63387.pdf (granting ICE Trust U.S., LLC. an exemption 
to clear CDS transactions); Order Extending Temporary Exemptions, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-63390, 99 SEC Docket 3485 (Nov. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/exorders/2010/34-63390.pdf (granting Eurex Clearing AG an exemption 
to clear CDS transactions). 
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While clearinghouses generally manage risks well using risk 
management techniques, a few clearinghouse failures have occurred.180 
For example, in 1974, after months of erratic and speculative movements 
in the price of white sugar, several large traders who executed 
transactions on the Caisse de Liquidation des Affaires en Marchandises 
(a commodity exchange) in Paris failed to meet their margin obligations; 
as a result, the clearinghouse collapsed.181 U.S. clearinghouses faced 
similar liquidity crises following episodes of market manipulation. In 
1976, the New York Mercantile Exchange faced a liquidity crisis after 
experiencing one of the largest defaults in the history of commodity 
futures trading; traders defaulted on over 1000 contracts for potato 
futures.182 An effort in 1979 by the infamous Hunt brothers to 
manipulate the world’s silver supply led to a crisis that threatened the 
solvency of the Commodity Exchange.183 Finally, in the wake of the 
1987 stock market crash, one of the largest counterparties of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange failed to satisfy its payment obligations, and a 
private bank had to intervene to prevent the collapse of one of the oldest 
clearinghouses in the United States.184 
While “the failure of clearinghouses due to poor risk management or 
excess risk taking has been relatively rare[,]”185 the incidents during the 
recent financial crisis and the Dodd-Frank Act’s assignment of primary 
regulatory authority to a concentrated group of clearing facilities raises 
red flags. Without proper controls, moral hazard concerns emerge;186 on 
the assumption that the federal government would bail out any insolvent 
clearinghouse to prevent systemic risks from materializing, 
clearinghouse directors may make risk management decisions that create 
the threat of liquidity crises. 
To address concerns that moral hazard and systemic risk concerns 
might lead to a taxpayer bailout, the Dodd-Frank Act includes an express 
statutory prohibition limiting the use of federal funds to prevent a swap 
                                                     
180. Acharya, Shachar & Subrahmanyam, supra note 148, at 400.  
181. In 1983, the Commodity Clearinghouse in Kuala Lumpur collapsed, and, in 1987, the 
Futures Guarantee Corporation also collapsed; in both of these cases, traders were also unable to 
settle their obligations with the clearinghouses. Id.  
182. Id.  
183. Id.  
184. Id. at 401. 
185. Id. at 402. 
186. “Moral hazard” describes a situation in which a person makes a decision that creates risk but 
another person bears the costs or negative externalities associated with the risk-taking decision. 
PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008, at 63 (2009). 
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dealer from becoming insolvent.187 Section 716 prohibits transfers of 
advances from the Federal Reserve discount window or from a Federal 
Reserve sponsored credit facility originated under Section 13 of the 
Federal Reserve Act.188 The Dodd-Frank Act further limits federal 
authorities from offering an assurance from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), making loans, or purchasing stock or 
equity interest or other assets from OTC derivatives market participants 
who may become insolvent.189 To emphasize Congressional intent to 
avoid bailing out OTC derivatives market participants, Section 716, 
referred to as the “Pushout Rule,” allows FDIC regulated institutions to 
remain eligible for federal assistance if they push derivatives activities 
out of their FDIC insured subsidiaries.190 
Notwithstanding the promise not to bail out swap market participants, 
the Federal Reserve and the Financial Stability Oversight Council have 
the authority to intervene in the event that a clearinghouse fails.191 As a 
systemically important financial institution or a financial market utility, 
a clearinghouse may still gain access to the Federal Reserve liquidity 
facilities.192 Regulators promulgating final Dodd-Frank Act regulations 
may alter this interpretation. The plain statutory language, however, 
creates the possibility for clearinghouses to receive federal aid to prevent 
their insolvency or to facilitate the unwinding of derivatives contracts on 
their platforms. 
Knowing that the Federal Reserve may serve as a liquidity provider of 
last resort heightens moral hazard concerns. The mere promise of 
emergency lending may severely weaken market participants’ resolve to 
adopt sufficiently rigorous risk management processes, limiting the 
efficacy of clearinghouses as primary regulators in OTC derivatives 
                                                     
187. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 716(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1648 (2010) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 8305 (Supp. 2011)) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including regulations), 
no Federal assistance may be provided to any swaps entity with respect to any swap, security-based 
swap, or other activity of the swaps entity.”). 
188. Id. § 716(b)(1). 
189. Id. There is, however, an exemption that permits the extension of aid to a major swap 
participant that is “an insured depository institution.” Id. § 716(g).   
190. Id. § 716(g).   
191. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended in 
scattered section of 12 U.S.C. (2006)). See also Lees Allen, supra note 160, at 1087; Adam Levitin, 
Response: The Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L. J. 445, 462 (2013) 
(noting that a clearinghouse may be deemed a systemically important financial institution market 
utility). 
192. Dodd-Frank Act § 805(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464(a)); Colleen Baker, The Federal 
Reserve as Last Resort, 46 MICH. J. L. REF. 69, 109–12 (2012). 
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markets.193 Without countervailing internal governance mechanisms, the 
implicit backstop of the federal government may ironically increase, 
rather than reduce, risk in OTC derivatives markets. 
C.  The Dodd Frank Act Imposes Federal Corporate Governance 
Reforms 
Legislators, regulators, and market participants have engaged in a 
spirited debate regarding the anticompetitive incentives, conflicts of 
interest, and institutional constraints that impede effective clearinghouse 
governance.194 Congressional committees considered, but declined to 
incorporate language in the statute expressly promoting specific 
governance requirements.195 Title VII does, however, authorize 
regulatory agencies to implement reforms to address governance, moral 
hazard, and systemic risk concerns. Under this authorization, the SEC 
and the CFTC proposed two alternatives.196 The agencies proposed rules 
limiting large dealers’ ability to obtain economic or voting control.197 
The rules aim to prevent directors sponsored by large dealers from 
dominating clearinghouse boards. In addition, the proposals impose 
                                                     
193. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address 
to the Council on Foreign Relations: Financial Reform To Address Systemic Risk (Mar. 10, 2009), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm.   
194. Greenberger, supra note 169, at 7–14 (describing clearinghouse members’ anticompetitive 
incentives to restrict membership and clearing eligibility); Griffith, supra note 161, at 1155–56; 
Yadav, supra note 161, at 395–99. 
195. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 111-370, at 188–92 (2009); Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 3306(a)(2)(D) (1st Sess. 2009) (amending the Commodity 
Exchange Act by revising § 5d(15)); id. § 3306(b)(2)(D) (amending the Securities Exchange Act by 
inserting § 17A(b)(3)(J)). Representative Stephen Lynch proposed an amendment to the working 
bill in the House of Representatives suggesting that it include language addressing members’ 
incentives to restrict access to membership. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 75. The “Lynch 
Amendment” proposed statutory language that would have expressly limited the voting interest of 
large dealers and imposed governance requirements designed to ensure that a majority of the 
members of the clearinghouse’s board were independent. Id. While the Lynch Amendment did not 
become part of the final legislation, the enacted statute does include language that empowers federal 
regulatory agencies to adopt rules addressing concerns regarding members’ incentives to restrict 
eligibility for clearinghouse membership and the types of transactions eligible for clearing. Id. 
196. Both the CFTC and the SEC proposed rules in October 2011. See Requirements for 
Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities 
Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010) (to 
be codified as 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 37, 38, 39, and 40); Governance Requirements for Derivatives 
Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities; Additional 
Requirements Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. Reg. 722 (proposed Jan. 6, 
2011) (to be codified as 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 37, 38, 39, and 40).  
197. See Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63732–53; Additional Requirements 
Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. Reg. at 722–37. 
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conventional corporate governance reforms, such as requiring boards to 
reserve seats for independent board members, create certain board 
committees, and appoint independent directors to a specified number of 
board and committee seats.198 
The first proposal, the “Voting Interest Focus Alternative,”199 creates 
individual and aggregate ownership limits for certain financial 
institutions described as “specified entities.”200 Under the “Voting 
Interest Focus Alternative,” a specified entity may not own directly or 
indirectly more than twenty percent of the voting interests of a 
clearinghouse.201 In addition, a group of specified entities may not 
collectively own more than forty percent of the aggregate voting 
interests of a clearinghouse.202 The approach limits large dealers’ ability 
to individually capture voting control, presumably diversifying the board 
of directors and increasing the likelihood of the board’s objective 
evaluation of membership, clearing, and risk management standards. 
In addition, regulators have proposed a “Governance Focused 
Alternative,” which prohibits any individual member or specified entity 
from owning more than five percent of the voting interest of a 
clearinghouse.203 The Governance Focused Alternative limits any 
individual dealer from gaining voting control and attempts to mitigate 
the likelihood that large dealers will collaborate to capture sufficient 
voting authority to control a clearinghouse board.204 
The Commissions’ proposals also aim to enhance clearinghouse 
boards’ objectivity by imposing board composition and committee 
                                                     
198. Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing 
Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges with 
Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882, 65,894 (proposed 
Oct. 26, 2010) (to be codified as 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).   
199. Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,893–94. 
200. Section 765(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the SEC to adopt rules that set numerical 
limits on the voting control of “Specified Entities” which includes bank holding companies with 
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more, a nonbank financial company, an affiliate company, a 
security-based swap dealer, or a major security based swap participant. See Mitigation of Conflicts 
of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,883. A parallel provision under Section 726(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act 
authorizes the CFTC to adopt rules of a bank holding company or nonbank financial limiting the 
voting control of Enumerated Entities. Additional Requirements Regarding the Mitigation of 
Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. Reg. at 722–37. (citing Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 726(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1695 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (Supp. 2011)). 
201. See Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,894–903. 
202. Id. at 65,895. 
203. See id. at 65,900. 
204. Id. 
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requirements.205 The Voting Interest Focus Alternative requires the 
clearinghouse to appoint independent directors to at least thirty-five 
percent of the clearinghouse’s board seats,206 while the Governance 
Focused Alternative requires clearinghouses to appoint independent 
directors to a majority of the board positions.207 Each proposal obligates 
the board of the clearinghouse to establish a nominating committee, 
disciplinary panel, and risk-management committee.208 The proposed 
structural and compositional requirements serve as a critical “check 
against conflicts of interests.”209 
Limiting large dealers’ ability to attain economic or voting control 
stymies their ability to influence the decisions of elected clearinghouse 
directors. If large dealers sponsor fewer directors, then their boards may 
face fewer conflicts and may independently assess risk management, 
collateral, margin, and capital contribution policies. A more independent 
board reduces the risk that clearinghouses will adopt artificial 
restrictions on membership access and clearing eligibility. 
Regulators’ proposed corporate governance reforms suffer, however, 
from commonly discussed shortcomings. Despite federal agencies’ 
efforts to implement standards that enforce fair and balanced clearing 
membership and eligibility criteria, large dealers may collaborate to 
overcome ownership and voting limits.210 Moreover, the appointment of 
independent directors may not effectively address concerns regarding 
policies that support large dealers’ commercial incentives. Evidence 
demonstrates that independent directors may face conflicts of interest 
similar to the conflicts that inside directors face.211 
                                                     
205. Id. at 65,896, 65,901–02. 
206. Id. at 65,896. The CFTC proposal requires “public directors,” but defines public directors in 
a manner consistent with the SEC definition of “independent director.” See Requirements for 
Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities 
Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732, 63,742 n.73 (proposed Oct. 
18, 2010) (to be codified as 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 37, 38, 39, and 40).  
207. Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,901. 
208. Under the SEC’s Voting Interest Focus Alternative, clearinghouses must appoint 
independent directors to at least a majority of the seats on the nominating committee. Under the 
Governance Focus Alternative, only independent directors may be appointed to the nominating 
committee. Id. at 65,897, 65,901. Under the CFTC approval, the chair for the disciplinary panels 
must be a public director. Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,740. The risk 
management committee requirements in the CFTC proposal offer greater details regarding the 
participation of public directors and include a requirement that at least ten percent of the participants 
on the risk management subcommittee be customer representatives. Id. at 63,740–42. 
209. Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,896. 
210. Greenberger, supra note 169, at 8. 
211. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and 
Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case 
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Proposed requirements for appointing independent directors are 
similarly weak. In order to comply, clearinghouse boards will recruit 
from a limited pool of qualified experts and industry insiders.212 
Evaluation of directors’ independence focuses on material and financial 
ties.213 In the insular group of qualified director candidates, it may be 
difficult to identify individuals who are truly independent—candidates 
who are free from relational ties to large dealers.214 Failing to consider 
the influence of structural or relational ties or the impact of cognitive 
limits unduly restricts evaluation of directors’ biases.215 
Clearinghouses function as critical engines in the operation of 
financial markets. Authorizing these institutions to serve as primary 
regulators, however, creates a uniquely public role for private 
businesses. While the introduction of clearinghouses alleviates some 
concerns regarding systemic risk in OTC derivatives markets, the recent 
financial crisis illustrates that OTC derivatives markets engender 
spillover effects that may impact the broader economy. Thus, significant 
risk governance concerns arise when members’ self-interested incentives 
and conflicts of interest reduce the likelihood that clearinghouses will 
enhance the safety and soundness of financial markets and serve as an 
                                                     
for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 174–76 (2010); see also Melanie B. Leslie, The 
Wisdom of Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179, 1201 (2010) 
(arguing that “groupthink” bias can undermine the decision-making process by ignoring information 
that challenges the majority’s viewpoint or elevating the opinions of particular group members 
above others); Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 237, 251–53 (2009) (describing how “in-group” bias makes directors more likely to 
side with other directors); Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 
WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 865 (2004) (explaining that structural bias theory demonstrates that, when 
faced with a conflict of interest, directors “are inherently prejudiced in favor of each other and of 
management, and may, consciously or unconsciously, favor their own interests over those of 
shareholders”). 
212. Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Laws, Norms, and the 
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 798–99, 815–16 
(2001). 
213. Id. at 798–99; Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1244 (2003). 
214. This Article adopts the definitions of “independence” incorporated in recently adopted 
proposed federal corporate governance reforms. Existing reforms preclude directors who receive a 
certain amount of compensation from any particular institution from asserting that she is an 
“independent” board member of that institution’s board. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title III § 301(3), 116 Stat. 745, 776 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(m)(3) (2006)). The Listed Company Manuals for the New York Stock Exchange and the 
NASDAQ adopt similar limiting provisions. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY 
MANUAL § 303A.02 (2013), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com; NASDAQ STOCK MARKET 
RULES, LISTING RULE § Rule 5605(a)(2) (2009), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/. 
215. Johnson, supra note 50, at 103–05; O’Connor, supra note 213, at 1251; Velasco, supra note 
211, at 824. 
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institutional safeguard against systemic risk and moral hazard concerns. 
Without sufficient governance controls, clearinghouses will not serve the 
gatekeeping function that Congress envisions and the imposition of 
clearing requirements will not provide the anticipated solution to risk 
management concerns in the OTC derivatives market. 
III.  SELF-REGULATION ADDRESSES SOME CONFLICTS AND 
EXACERBATES OTHERS 
As Part I explained, when owners delegate decision-making authority 
to professional managers, conflicts of interest may arise; professional 
managers’ interests may diverge from the interests of owners. Corporate 
governance mechanisms enable owners to monitor managers. When an 
industry develops a specialized firm to enhance the order of a particular 
market, market participants and regulators rely on similar governance 
tools. The development of exchanges and clearinghouses illustrates the 
creation of specialized firms in the finance industry. Part II explores the 
difficulties of relying on boards of directors appointed by market 
participants who own and control OTC derivatives clearinghouses. In 
response to concerns that clearinghouse boards may not adopt regulation 
consistent with federal mandates, federal regulators have imposed 
corporate governance reforms similar to those regularly employed by 
various businesses. 
The introduction of OTC derivatives clearinghouses represents a 
hybrid solution; the clearinghouses are private but serve a public 
regulatory function. This Part explores the merits of this hybrid 
regulatory approach and argues that an emerging theory within the self-
regulation paradigm offers critical insights for maximizing the benefits 
of this approach and mitigating the costs. 
A.  Regulatory Theories Fall Along a Continuum 
There are three dominant regulatory paradigms: a laissez-faire 
approach, a government-centered approach, and a self-regulatory 
approach. Careful examination reveals that these regulatory approaches 
fall along a continuum. The first two theoretical approaches rest at either 
end of the continuum. At one end of the continuum, the laissez-faire 
regulatory approach is characterized by the absence of an external 
regulator.216 
Under the laissez-faire, or free market approach, the government’s 
                                                     
216. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 386 (2011). 
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role is typically limited to enforcing private contracts. Arguments 
supporting the free market approach emphasize norms such as economic 
efficiency, liquidity, innovation, and entrepreneurialism. The command-
and-control approach, which lies at the other end of the continuum, 
reposes absolute authority in the government or its delegated agencies. 
Under the command-and-control regulatory approach, government 
authorities adopt, implement, and enforce regulation through 
administrative proceedings. 
Both the free market and command-and-control approaches are fairly 
controversial; few commentators support a pure form of either model. 
Critics of the free market regulatory model blame deregulation or 
reliance on a private market ordering for the implosion in the OTC 
derivatives markets during the recent crisis.217 Commentators have 
expressed similar discontent with the command-and-control regulatory 
approach. The state-centered regulatory model rests on three 
assumptions: homogeneity, rigidity, and competency. This approach 
presumes that regulated firms are homogenous and that regulators’ 
imposition of rigid, uniform, inflexible, prophylactic rules offers an 
effective regulatory solution.218 Government agencies are assumed to 
have sufficient competence to implement market oversight.219 These 
assumptions are often inaccurate. As a result of these weaknesses, 
theorists typically reject pure forms of the dominant regulatory 
approaches. 
Self-regulation, however, offers a hybrid regulatory theory that 
incorporates the most beneficial elements of laissez-faire and command-
and-control approaches.220 Self-regulation mitigates the costs of the 
models at the ends of the regulatory continuum. Within this framework, 
                                                     
217. See, e.g., Andre Cummings, Racial Coding and the Financial Market Crisis, 2011 UTAH L. 
REV. 141, 156–57 (2011); Johnson, supra note 20, at 173; Johnson, supra note 50, at 76–77. 
218. For a survey of the expansive literature that supports the construction of this paradigm, see 
Timothy F. Malloy, The Social Construction of Regulation: Lessons from the War Against 
Command and Control, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 267, 280 (2010). Through the adoption of rigid rules and 
standards, a top-down, centralized decision-making authority resolves disputes regarding resource 
allocation or requests for licenses by requiring conformity with stated standards. See James E. Krier, 
Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 449, 451 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems 
with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 1019 (1995); see also Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, 
Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 302 (1995). Financial markets commentators often 
express strong resistance to the command-and-control approach because it is rigid, inflexible, costly, 
misguided, and often fails to address undesirable conduct.  
219. See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform 
Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reform, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1270–73 (1985) 
(arguing in favor of uniform command-and-control regulation). 
220. Omarova, supra note 60, at 675–76. 
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regulators, private trade organizations, and market participants engage in 
a regulatory dialectic, collaboratively developing governance 
standards.221 
Self-regulation offers a dynamic alternative to the presumed binary 
choice between a laissez-fare and a command and control regulatory 
approach. Self-regulation is, however, an elusive theoretical concept. 
Within the bandwidth of the theory of self-regulation, there are several 
organizational models. Certain applications of self-regulation adopt 
more significant levels of government participation, while other models 
endow market participants with greater amounts of regulatory authority. 
Resolving the weaknesses in self-regulation requires carefully 
examining the contours of this regulatory model. The theory of New 
Governance offers salient lessons that identify critical attributes of the 
self-regulatory model and adapt the model to engender a better-tailored 
regulatory approach. 
B.  New Governance Proposes a New Vision of Self-Regulation 
New Governance literature examines the contours of the theory of 
self-regulation.222 New Governance deconstructs self-regulation and 
explores commonly adopted self-regulatory practices. New Governance 
is a “bottom-up, decentered, horizontal experimental process by private 
actors”223 that reinterprets the notion of self-regulation.224 
New Governance focuses on critical characteristics of self-regulation, 
such as accountability, participation, and experimentation. To determine 
                                                     
221. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 868 (2006). There are, 
however, commentators who challenge the efficacy of self-regulation. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 
1529 (2005) (critiquing reforms imposing a blend of federal mandates that impose internal corporate 
governance requirements because of the lack of empirical evidence correlating the reforms to 
regulated entities’ undesirable behavior). But see Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-
Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 
1845 (2007).  
222. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 1, 7–20 (1992); EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE 
BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995); Charles F. Sabel & 
William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1016 (2004); Mark Tushnet, A New Constitutionalism for Liberals?, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 357, 360 (2003).  
223. Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial 
Regulation, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 441, 445 (2010). 
224. See Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New 
Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 566 (2007). 
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whether self-regulatory policies satisfy public expectations for 
governance, theorists evaluate three aspects of the policies. First, 
theorists examine whether self- regulatory policies are consistent with 
public interests in the regulated market. Self-regulating institutions are 
accountable when they implement reward and penalty systems that 
reinforce public policy goals. Second, accountable self-regulatory 
businesses adopt a culture and best practice standards that encourage 
executives and employees to consider the effect of their activities on 
third parties.225 Finally, accountable, self-regulatory policies lead market 
participants to internalize the negative externalities that market activities 
engender.226 
Complimenting accountability, New Governance encourages greater 
participation and problem solving through consensus building. As Orly 
Lobel explains, New Governance challenges conventional assumptions 
about regulation by “broaden[ing] the decision-making playing field.”227 
This approach invites a broader group of market participants, regulators 
and members of affected communities into the regulatory process.228 
Increasing the diversity of actors who participate in the decision-making 
process leads to a more dynamic conversation regarding the substance of 
regulation.229 
In addition, New Governance encourages experimentation with 
diverse solutions. Louis Brandeis famously proposed that the federal 
government should permit state governments to explore diverse 
solutions to regulatory questions.230 Similarly, New Governance 
introduces experimental processes that inspire creative solutions to 
regulatory questions. Experimentation facilitates innovation and 
encourages best practices standards.231 
The elements of participation and experimentation work in tandem to 
create a feedback loop, providing invaluable information to regulators. 
                                                     
225. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 384 (2004).  
226. Id.  
227. Id. at 373. 
228. Id. 
229. David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New 
Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 327 (2008). 
230. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting 
that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country . . . . If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be 
bold”).  
231. See Lobel, supra note 225, at 460.  
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Regulators may aggregate the information that they receive, thereby 
enhancing their understanding of the costs and benefits of various 
approaches.232 Based on the information that they receive, regulators 
adjust provisional rules to better achieve public policy goals.233 The 
sustainability of New Governance rests on the continuous monitoring 
and re-visitation of regulations as aggregated data informs the learning 
process.234 Experimentation enables regulators to adjust methods to 
better accomplish regulatory goals. 
The theory of New Governance emerged from an eclectic group of 
legal disciplines and regulated markets, including environmental law, 
corporate law, health care law, employment discrimination law, cyber 
law, community policing, and nanotechnology.235 Scholars exploring the 
applications of New Governance have described the theory as “soft 
law,”236 “reflexive law,”237 “enforced self-regulation,”238 “negotiated 
governance,”239 “responsive regulation,”240 “collaborative 
governance,”241 and “communicative governance.”242 New Governance 
invites “flexible, responsive administrative practices [that] may be the 
only alternative to big, blunt bureaucracies on the one hand, and private 
                                                     
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 34, 57 (1997). 
235. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 297–326 (1999); Ford, supra 
note 223 (describing the application of New Governance in financial markets); Susan Sturm, Second 
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 475–76 
(2001) (describing the application of New Governance in employment discrimination law); 
Gurumurthy Ramachandran, et al., Recommendations for Oversight of Nanobiotechnology: 
Dynamic Oversight for Complex and Convergent Technology, 13 J. Nanoparticle Res. 1345, 1354–
55 (2011).  
236. Kerstin Jacobsson, Innovations in EU Governance: The Case of Employment Policy Co-
ordination, 3 n.3 (Stockholm Ctr. for Organizational Research, Working Paper No. 2001:12, 2001), 
available at http://www.score.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.26668.1320939808!/200112.pdf. 
237. ALBERTO FEBBRAJO & GUNTHER TEUBNER, STATE, LAW AND ECONOMY AS AUTOPOIETIC 
SYSTEMS: REGULATION AND AUTONOMY IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE 1 (1992). 
238. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 222, at 101.  
239. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 
WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 487 (2003). 
240. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 222, at 16.  
241. Freeman, supra note 234, at 33. 
242. See Martijn Van Vliet, Environmental Regulation of Business: Options and Constraints for 
Communicative Governance, in MODERN GOVERNANCE: NEW GOVERNMENT—SOCIETY 
INTERACTIONS 105, 105 (Jan Kooiman ed., 1993). 
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market mechanisms on the other.”243 
In a seminal examination of the principles of the theory, Ian Ayers 
and John Braithwaite explained that New Governance encourages 
regulators to continue to entrust regulation to market participants but 
emphasizes the significance of accountability, participation, and 
experimentation.244 Fundamentally, New Governance counterbalances 
the weaknesses of self-regulation by emphasizing regulated entities’ 
accountability to the broader communities where they operate. 
Important criticisms, however, challenge the effectiveness of New 
Governance. Empirical studies evaluating New Governance policies 
reveal mixed conclusions regarding the benefits of the theory.245 Some 
studies suggest that New Governance offers a valuable tool for ensuring 
compliance with the law.246 Yet, it is difficult to establish a correlation 
between New Governance and enhanced compliance with regulatory 
programs247 because a number of variables influence market 
participants’ decision to comply with regulatory requirements.248 A 
board representative appointed by regulators may ensure that SROs 
implement New Governance principles. 
IV.  PROSECUTORS AND PRIVATE MARKETS SUGGEST AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO TRADITIONAL SELF-GOVERNANCE 
Historically, financial market regulators have employed self-
regulation in the financial services industry. Firms are subject to internal 
compliance programs and participate in private, self-regulatory 
organizations that impose and enforce rules consistent with federal law. 
As Part II noted, there are significant weaknesses in the current 
architectural framework of this approach, particularly in the application 
of this approach in OTC derivatives markets. This Part examines an 
approach for redesigning self-regulation based on principles proposed 
under the theory of New Governance and offers a proposal to better-
tailor clearinghouse governance to address systemic risk concerns. 
                                                     
243. Lobel, supra note 225, at 443. 
244. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 222, at 126. 
245. Id.  
246. See generally Lobel, supra note 225, at 457.  
247. Id. 
248. Id.  
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A.  Board Monitors or Board Observers Ensure Compliance with 
Federal Regulations 
The increasing complexity in financial markets and the far- reaching 
effects of market disruptions create deep suspicions regarding the merits 
of a purely laissez-faire regulatory model.249 Most financial market 
participants agree that, at a minimum, private institutions are necessary 
to mitigate credit and operational risks in markets that create systemic 
risks.250 Mandating clearing of OTC derivatives shifts the regulatory 
approach in OTC derivatives markets from a free market model to a self-
regulatory framework. If a self-regulatory approach is employed in OTC 
derivatives markets, New Governance may offer guidance as regulators 
develop the structural and organizational details of this regulatory 
framework. New Governance theories offer a better-tailored approach 
for resolving the governance concerns that OTC derivatives 
clearinghouses face. 
Appointing a special director, designated to participate in 
clearinghouse boards’ decision-making processes, offers one method of 
incorporating New Governance principles into this self-regulatory 
process. Consistent with New Governance principles, the special director 
can mitigate the influence of market participants’ anti-competitive 
interests, conflicts of interest, and policies that undermine the 
clearinghouse’s role in risk oversight. The director, because of her role, 
might be described as a board monitor or a board observer. 
Federal regulators and prosecutors frequently rely on an appointed 
corporate monitor to assess a corporate entity’s compliance with federal 
law.251 The Department of Justice (DOJ), SEC, and other federal 
                                                     
249. Paul Krugman, Their Own Private Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2011, at A31 (referencing 
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report, which concludes that “30 years of deregulation and 
reliance on self-regulation” created the catastrophe); Arash Massoudi, Concern over US Exchange 
Self Regulation, FIN. TIMES, June 21, 2012, at D1; Louise Story, A Secretive Banking Elite Rules 
Derivative Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, at A1 (determining that “[f]undamentally, the 
banks are not good at self-regulation . . . .”). 
250. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CFTC-SEC STAFF ROUNDTABLE ON CLEARING 
OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 1, 66–67 (Oct. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/ 
dfsubmission/dfsubmission7_102210-transcrip.pdf; COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, 
JOINT CFTC-SEC STAFF ROUNDTABLE ON IMPLEMENTATION PHASING FOR FINAL RULES FOR 
SWAPS AND SECURITY-BASED SWAPS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1, 35 (May 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/csjac_transcript050211.pdf. 
251. A rich body of literature has emerged examining the cooperative concessions described in 
the Department of Justice memoranda issued since 1999, including the waiver of attorney client 
privilege and work product doctrine. See, e.g., Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate 
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regulatory agencies, impose corporate monitors on subject companies 
after criminal investigations, prosecutions, or indictments.252 The 
responsibilities of the monitor are often memorialized in deferred 
prosecution agreements (DPAs), non-prosecution agreements (NPAs)253 
or consent decrees.254 
A similar market-based solution exists among venture capital and 
private equity firms. These businesses frequently acquire interests in 
fledging firms and negotiate for the right to appoint an observer to the 
board of directors.255 The board observer analyzes the information 
distributed to the board and periodically delivers reports to the private 
equity or venture capital investors who appointed her to monitor the 
board’s decisions.256 Unlike any of the elected directors, a board monitor 
or observer would report directly to and receive compensation from the 
federal regulatory organizations that oversee clearinghouses’ compliance 
with Title VII. The presence of the board monitor or observer would 
                                                     
Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 969 (2009); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 
93 VA. L. REV. 853, 893–902 (2007); Gideon Mark & Thomas C. Pearson, Corporate Cooperation 
During Investigations and Audits, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 5 (2007). 
252. See Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate 
Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 691, 731 (2008).  
253. During the course of criminal investigations, upon a guilty plea, or following a criminal 
conviction under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968 (2006), and other federal laws, the DOJ has agreed to enter into settlement agreements with 
companies subject to enforcement. As part of the settlement agreement, the DOJ required the 
appointment of a corporate monitor. Ford & Hess, supra note 252, at 684.  
254. The SEC has the authority under Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act to enjoin 
activity that violates federal securities laws. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(d) (2006); see also Daniel J. Morrissey, SEC Injunctions, 68 TENN. L. REV. 427, 439–40 
(2001); David M. Weiss, Reexamining the SEC’s Use of Obey-the-Law Injunctions, 7 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 239, 242 (2006). Under DPAs, NPAs, other settlement agreements, or consent decrees, the 
DOJ appoints monitors to review and report on the legal compliance of the firms, organizations, and 
institutions, including corporations, labor unions, public schools, prisons, and police and fire 
departments, that are subject to enforcement proceedings. Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. 
Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1714–20 
(2007). The DOJ and other federal agencies have a long history of using settlement agreements 
requiring the appointment of independent consultants, examiners, and private inspector generals to 
report on a firm’s current and likely future compliance with federal law. Id. These settlement 
agreements, consent decrees, DPAs, and NPAs often create conditions consistent with corporate 
probation. Christopher Wray, Corporate Probation Under the New Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017, 2027–28 (1992) (describing how the 1991 Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines adopted the use of corporate probation and obligated firms subject to 
enforcement to appoint a special monitor). 
255. Mark J. Graffagnini, Corporate Strategies for Nanotech Companies and Investors in New 
Economic Times, 6 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 251, 258 (2009) (describing strategic investors 
and venture capital funds investment in nanotechnology start-up companies).  
256. Id.  
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offer the clearinghouses greater insight into federal agencies’ regulatory 
expectations and provide greater transparency in the regulation of 
clearinghouses. 
B.  Evaluating Monitors and Observers’ Performance Poses a 
Challenge 
Monitors or observers engender significant benefits, but it may be 
difficult for these outsiders to accomplish certain principles outlined in 
the New Governance literature. Monitors or observers function as an 
important liaison between financial market participants and regulators 
that enhances risk oversight. Currently, industry efforts to expand 
interoperability are limited, meaning it is difficult to facilitate clearing 
and settlement across clearinghouse platforms.257 Unlike a clearinghouse 
board which can only view market participants’ risk exposure on their 
individual platforms, a monitor or observer can solicit information from 
all OTC derivatives clearinghouses and assess all market participants’ 
risk exposure across OTC derivatives markets. 
In the absence of a market-based commitment to aggregating the 
information across OTC derivatives transactions, board observers or 
board monitors may report transaction-related data to the regulatory 
agency assigned as the primary regulator of the clearinghouse. The 
agencies may then report information to the Financial Stability 
Oversight Committee (FSOC)258 and the Office of Financial Research.259 
Armed with timely and more complete information, FSOC and the 
Office of Financial Research will be better positioned to anticipate and 
mitigate systemic risk concerns in OTC derivatives markets. 
The board monitor or observer will ensure that clearinghouses are 
more accountable by assessing, evaluating, and advising clearinghouse 
boards regarding important risk management policies. In addition, the 
board monitor or observer increases the diversity of participants 
                                                     
257. Scott, supra note 159, at 700 nn.124, 127. 
258. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1392 (2010) (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 5321 (Supp. 2011)) (establishing the FSOC); Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, 
Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1674–75 (2011). 
259. Dodd–Frank Act § 152(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5342) (establishing the Office of 
Financial Research); McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 258, at 1670; Jennifer Taub, Great 
Expectations for the Office of Financial Research, 23 (Oct. 4, 2011) (unpublished paper), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1784298; see also OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 1–5, 59–64 (2012), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/ofr/Documents/OFR_Annual_Report_071912_Final.pdf; 
OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 1, 8–10 (2012), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/ofr/Documents/OFRStrategicFramework.pdf. 
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involved in regulation, offering an expert representative who has no 
financial ties to the clearinghouse or large dealers that control the board. 
The board monitor or observer is free from the politics of board election 
processes and does not face the conflicts that elected directors face. 
Therefore, the board observer or monitor may freely challenge policies 
that are antithetical to risk-mitigating public policy goals. Finally, the 
role of the board monitor or observer does not detract from the authority 
state law assigns to the board or the efficiency of the board’s decision-
making process; the board monitor or observer will not vote on board 
decisions. 
Monitors or observers, however, may not fully achieve the goals of 
New Governance. Similar to corporate monitors, clearinghouse board 
monitors and observers may face constraints in the timing of their 
service and the scope of their duties. Such limitations would impede the 
clearinghouses’ accountability for the negative externalities that they 
engender and the greater depth of participation envisioned by regulators. 
As the corporate monitor who was appointed in 2002 following the 
SEC’s prosecution of WorldCom, Inc. noted, there are persistent 
challenges that inhibit a monitor’s execution of his responsibilities.260 
The WorldCom monitor’s authority was limited to preventing the 
destruction of documents evidencing WorldCom’s pervasive fraud.261 
Establishing the appropriate limits on the monitor’s authority may be 
difficult. 
There are many reasons that critics challenge the appointment of a 
monitor. First, courts generally appoint monitors in cases involving 
criminal misconduct.262 While there are examples of monitors appointed 
in civil cases, these examples are less common.263 Seeking participation 
in the board room represents an invasion into the most intimate 
exchanges in the life of a corporation. If the appointment of a monitor is 
                                                     
260. Following the massive accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco in the early 
2000s, the SEC increased its use of corporate monitors. See Jennifer O’Hare, The Use of the 
Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN & COM. L. 89, 96 (2006). 
Judge Jed Rakoff of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York signed the order 
appointing the corporate monitor of WorldCom within two days of the SEC filing its complaint 
requesting the monitor. Within a week, the court and parties agreed upon a process for selecting a 
monitor, identified candidates, and agreed upon the appointment of Richard S. Breeden, former 
Chairman of the SEC. See Stipulation and Order of June 28, 2002, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 
Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002); Memo to Civil Docket Clerk, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 
Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2002). 
261. SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14201, at *3–4 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2002). 
262. See, e.g., O’Hare, supra note 260, at 96.  
263. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 254, at 1733. 
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a form of punishment, then requiring boards of clearinghouses or other 
important financial institutions to appoint a monitor in advance of 
evidence of wrongdoing may be difficult to justify. This approach also 
seems to create a greater right to participate than New Governance 
requires. 
Second, there is no universally agreed upon criteria for evaluating the 
performance of a board observer of corporate monitor.264 In addition, the 
board observers and board monitors have disparate mandates. Mission 
creep, or a monitor’s expanding powers and authority, further 
complicates any evaluation of the merits of appointing a monitor.265 
Finally, corporate monitors are appointed for a term, meaning, upon the 
expiration of the term, there is no means to ensure that the monitor 
served as an effective antidote to overcome the incentives, conflicts, or 
institutional constraints that limit effective risk management. 
These concerns, however, are not fatal to the proposal. Regulators can 
carefully tailor the scope of board monitor or observers’ responsibilities 
to empower board observers or monitors to detect risk management and 
legal compliance concerns while respecting the intimacy of the 
boardroom. Because the board monitor or observer does not vote, the 
proposals respect the sanctity of the relationship between members or 
shareholders and the clearinghouse businesses that they own or manage. 
In addition, regulators can be flexible in their assignments of monitors 
and observers, crafting specific missions and adjusting the term of the 
board monitor or observer in accordance with other internal risk 
oversight mechanisms such as board composition, risk management 
technology, or frequent, voluntary disclosure of more comprehensive 
material information than federal regulations require. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article questions the existing architectural framework of self-
regulation in financial markets. Historically, financial services firms 
have adopted internal compliance programs and participated in private, 
collective trade organizations that impose rules on individual market 
                                                     
264. See Ford & Hess, supra note 252, at 691.  
265. In WorldCom, however, Judge Rakoff expanded the monitor’s mission by granting the 
monitor authority to solicit “complete information about every aspect of the business,” to interview 
any employee, and to participate in any meetings, discussions (bankruptcy or other), or proceedings 
relevant to the monitor’s mission. WorldCom, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14201, at *4. Moreover, the 
monitor was granted authority to attend all WorldCom board and board committee meetings. The 
final consent decree between WorldCom and the SEC further extended the monitor’s powers, 
permitting the monitor to engage in every aspect of WorldCom’s general operations. 
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participants and the industry. The prevailing view suggests that this 
framework employs elements that effectively align market participants’ 
and SROs’ interests with broader normative regulatory goals. Recent 
scandals and financial crises, however, undermine the assumptions 
supporting this claim. 
Proponents of self-regulation rightly assert that for centuries SROs 
have adopted, implemented, and enforced desirable regulatory norms. 
The LIBOR rate-rigging scandal described above illustrates how 
conflicts of interest within and among financial institutions undermine 
self-regulation. In the case of the LIBOR scandal, BBA member banks 
face a persistent tension between reporting accurately (even if such 
reporting negatively impacts their individual financial condition) or 
misreporting, manipulating, and threatening the integrity of LIBOR. 
These conflicts are pervasive and commonly arise within SROs.266 
This Article disputes the oversimplification of the regulatory debate 
which characterizes the financial markets regulation framework as a 
static, binary choice between a free market approach or a top-down 
regulatory regime. Economic organization theory supports the creation 
and empowerment of SROs. According to economic organization theory, 
the creation of SROs engenders valuable benefits including greater 
transparency, operational integrity, and economic efficiency. 
There are numerous challenges, however, to adopting a self-
regulatory framework in OTC derivatives markets. Clearinghouse boards 
face intractable conflicts of interest and institutional constraints. The 
Dodd-Frank Act proposes weak corporate governance measures to 
address these concerns. The proposed reforms leave clearinghouses 
vulnerable to manipulation by the market participants who control the 
internal decision-making processes within clearinghouses. Regulatory 
design must address these complex and dynamic conflicts of interest. 
To address weaknesses in the SRO model, this Article argues that 
regulation must introduce well-tailored governance reforms that enhance 
effective risk management within clearinghouses. Employing principles 
from the theory of New Governance and drawing from other examples 
in the finance literature, this Article advocates for appointing a board 
monitor or observer to clearinghouse boards. This expert, independent 
third party would enhance risk management decision-making in OTC 
derivatives markets, mitigate moral hazard and systemic risk concerns, 
and thereby protect financial markets from the perils of future crises. 
                                                     
266. See generally Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON 
REG. 91, 93 (2012); Justin T. Wong, LIBOR Left in Limbo: A Call for More Reform, 13 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 365, 372 (2009). 
